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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with using micro-level data to examine important features of
the process of development which occur on a much larger scale. Using a uniquely long
and detailed dataset for a single village in India, allied with data from other sources, we
explore what development at the level of a village can tell us about development at the
level of a state or country. In the rst chapter we introduce the village setting of this
thesis - Palanpur, describe the data, and document the broad features of development
experienced by the village over the course of 60 years. We focus on changes in employ-
ment, education, migration within the village - and relate these to the development of
India or other areas where appropriate. The overriding picture is one of a village which
has been touched by the outside world. The Green revolution initiated sustained growth
in agricultural productivity. Large numbers have moved out of subsistence agriculture
into non-agricultural pursuits, many of these outside the village. There have been sub-
stantial increases in education, migration, and income levels - similar in magnitude to
other areas of India.
The second chapter investigates how structural transformation, the reallocation of
economic activity from agriculture to manufacturing and services, is experienced for
economic entities smaller than countries. Despite a vast macroeconomic literature con-
cerning structural transformation for countries along their development path there is
little evidence on the nature of structural transformation at a more microeconomic level.
Firstly, we document the stylised facts of structural transformation from the empirical
macroeconomic literature. Secondly, we show that these stylised facts are consistent
with India’s development experience over more than 100 years. We then proceed to
document how these empirical facts map onto progressively smaller geographic areas
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within India. Finally we demonstrate that these features of structural transformation
hold true even at the level of a single village in India. The pattern of sectoral realloca-
tion in terms of both income and employment shares is strikingly similar and consistent
with the extant stylised facts at all levels. This result has important implications for the
way we should think about the complementarity of agricultural and non-agricultural
development.
The third chapter explores the role of employment networks within the process of
development in rural India. The relevant networks we examine are caste and extended
family networks, called dynasties. We rst establish that there exist job networks in non-
agricultural employment for individuals working outside the village. These networks
have large eects, and these eects are larger for extended family networks. We then
demonstrate that these job networks exhibit competition from fellow network members.
As a placebo test we conrm smaller or non-existent network eects for another type of
employment believed to be less prone to job referral networks. The second part of this
chapter then tests if these dynasty network eects observed for outside employment are
consistent with a model of labour market network dynamics. The data are consistent
with the model and display both a negative competition eect and a positive information
eect. Dynasty network cohorts who arrive in the labour market prior to workers have
a positive eect on their employment prospects but those who arrive at the same time
have a negative impact. The chapter nishes with some evidence on the potential long
run implications of these networks.
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Chapter 1
Palanpur: Development Writ Small
This thesis is concerned with using micro-level data to examine important fea-
tures of the process of development which occur on a much larger scale. Using
a uniquely long and detailed dataset for a single village in India, allied with
data from other sources, we explore what development at the level of a village
can tell us about development at the level of a state or country. In this chapter
we introduce the village setting of this thesis - Palanpur, describe the data, and
document the broad features of development experienced by the village over
the course of 60 years. We focus on changes in employment, education, migra-
tion within the village - and relate these to the development of India or other
areas where appropriate. The overriding picture is one of a village which has
been touched by the outside world. The Green revolution initiated sustained
growth in agricultural productivity. Large numbers have moved out of sub-
sistence agriculture into non-agricultural pursuits, many of these outside the
village. There have been substantial increases in education, migration, and
income levels - similar in magnitude to other areas of India.
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1.1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a focus on panel data with large numbers of individuals
over short time periods which are used to answer many questions in development. In
this thesis we ask what we can learn about the process of development from another type
of dataset: one which examines the same individuals over a long time period. There are
interesting and important features of development which by their nature take time, and
therefore cannot be examined without this time dimension. The Palanpur data upon
which this thesis is based contains individual level data that span 1957 to 2015.
The reason for the general focus on panels which span short time periods in develop-
ment is obvious. One cannot simply collect 60 years of data at a given time, it takes 60
years to collect it. This is typically longer than an academic career, thus the incentives
are not strong for academics to establish panels which are focused on long run questions.
In developed countries some of this space is occupied by national statistical oces who
have the capacity to invest in long run panels. The longest running of these is the United
States Panel Study of Income Dynamics which began in 19681, more than 10 years after
the commencement of the Palanpur data. Other countries have household panels which
begin usually in the 1980s and 1990s - for example Germany, United Kingdom, Canada
and Japan. However, in developing countries there are generally greater concerns for
national governments than collecting panel data, even if the country has the state capa-
city to do so. Notable household panel data which exist in developing countries include
the Indonesian Family Life Survey which began in 1993, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dy-
namics Survey (KIDS) of KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa which began in 1993
and was extended in 2008 to the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) which covers
1https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu
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the whole country.
Those panel studies which are closest to the Palanpur data are those in India and
Bangladesh. The Additional Rural Incomes Survey and Rural Economic and Demo-
graphic Survey (ARIS-REDS) panel from the NCAER includes four rounds between 1971
and 20062. The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)
Village Level Studies began in 1975 with a sample of 240 households from six villages
in two Indian states. It has been extended at dierent times to include households from
a further fourteen villages. However, these surveys are samples of households within
villages rather than a census, so they are prone to losing households through death or
splitting of households (Foster and Rosenzweig (2002)). Similar in spirit, if not in con-
tent, is the Health and Demographic Surveillance System in Matlab, Bangladesh, which
began registering all births, deaths and migrations in 149 villages in 1966. While there
have been occasional censuses undertaken, there is only detailed economic data for a
representative sample in 1996.
We are fortunate to have access to a panel of detailed information from a single village
in India beginning in 1957 and ending in 2015. This is a longer timespan than the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. It is also longer than 61% of the country-level
GDP series from the Penn World Tables data (version 9), Feenstra et al. (2015).
These data are incredibly detailed on many dimensions. They consist of 7 surveys
which are undertaken as censuses of the village. Data collected by enumerators include
demographics, land ownership, cultivation, land rental, outstanding loans, occupation,
labour contracts in which village residents are engaged, wage rates, income, nutrition
and consumption. Although the exact dimensions upon which data were collected varies
2See Foster and Rosenzweig (2002); Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) or the NCAER website for details of
this panel: http://www.ncaer.org/data.php
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by survey, the demographic, employment, land ownership, and education data are avail-
able for the full period. There is also a huge amount of qualitative data and observations,
including diaries kept by researchers for many months.
During the period covered by the Palanpur data, India has experienced a huge amount
of change. In 1957 India was a young independent country, seven years after completion
of their constitution, with a GDP per capita of 944 in 2011 international dollars3. While
by 2015 India was one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and the 3rd largest in
PPP terms4. GDP per capita in 2014 was 5,452 in 2011 international dollars. The de-
velopment of India in this period has not just been economic. Life expectancy at birth
has risen from 39.65 between 1955-1960 to 67.57 between 2010-2015, in the same period
under-ve mortality has fallen from 255 to 52 per 1,000 live births5. Coincident to this
improvement in health outcomes, India has experienced a demographic transition - total
fertility as measured by children per woman has declined more than 50 percent6. Palan-
pur is uniquely positioned to explore the causes and consequences of this tremendous
change at the micro level.
These data are able to help us to answer a number of questions which are important
to development economists. Have the increases in economic development transferred to
the rural poor? Have these improvements in well-being changed the income distribu-
tion? What have been the causes and consequences of these changes in relative income?
What determines who migrates away? Has this changed over time? The data also allow
us to truly examine intergenerational eects, not just look at contemporaneous eects
of parental states as is common in the literature due to data limitations. It also may be
3Output-side real GDP per capita from PWT 9.0
4Feenstra et al. (2015)
5United Nations (2017)
61955-1960: 5.90. 2010-2015: 2.44 from United Nations (2017)
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that comparisons across space, in lieu of available longitudinal data, result in dierent
answers due to confounding locational fundamentals or other confounders about which
we are unaware. The use of a single location over a long time period avoids this potential
pitfall.
This chapter describes in detail the setting and data for this thesis, and the experience
of this village over nearly 60 years of study. The following section introduces Palanpur
and describes the broad changes it has experienced during the study period. Clearly we
are not the rst to examine this panel. Palanpur data have been the source of many
important contributions to the understanding of Indian development, and development
more generally. These are discussed in Section 1.3. The subsequent sections examine
Palanpur in more detail, with emphasis on its employment (Section 1.4), education (Sec-
tion 1.5) and migration (Section 1.6) patterns during the 60 year study period. Section 1.7
concludes and introduces the following chapters of this thesis which focus on specic
questions which can only be answered with data such as these.
1.2. Palanpur 1957-2015
Palanpur is probably the most famous of India’s 640,930 villages7. It has been studied by
social scientists since 1957, when the Agricultural Economics Research Centre (AERC)
of the University of Delhi began their rst survey. The village has since been visited by
surveyors in every decade, in 1963/64, 1974/75, 1983/84, 1993, 2008/10 and 20158. The
data is now of such length that it includes a number of great-grandchildren of original
1958 survey members.
7Ministry of Rural Development, 2012. http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/SYB2014/ch42.html (Ac-
cessed 4/8/16)
8For simplicity, from now on I will refer to the surveys as 1958, 1964, 1975, 1984, 1993, 2009 and 2015
respectively.
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Figure 1.1.: Palanpur in 2009
Note: GIS Map of Palanpur in 2009
Source: Palanpur Survey Team. Constructed by Ruchira Bhattacharya, Himanshu and
Ashish Tyagi, reproduced with their permission.
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Palanpur was not chosen because it was unique, it was just one of many villages
chosen to be part of the AERCs continuous village surveys. The reason we remember it
and study it still is that Christopher Bliss and Nicholas Stern were looking for baseline
data to examine the impacts of the “green revolution”, and went back to re-survey Pa-
lanpur in 1974. Nicholas Stern has been involved in every survey of Palanpur since.
While the intention of the original surveys was the study of agriculture, they collected
data on many aspects of the village. Bliss and Stern chose Palanpur because it was not
dominated by “an unusual craft or crop”, and because it was “large enough to encom-
pass a certain amount of variety but not too large to permit a detailed study including
all its households.” They also required wheat to be a major crop in the village, and for
the village to be accessible from Delhi but not too close to ensure independence from
its economy. They hoped that tenancy would be common since “that subject was one of
their main interests.” They also required independent living arrangements for the team
of four researchers.
The data contain a huge amount of qualitative and quantitative data. Enumerators
spent an enormous amount of time in the village conducting the surveys. The surveys
were conducted as censuses of the village. There is detailed information on demograph-
ics, land ownership, cultivation, land rental, outstanding loans, occupation, labour con-
tracts in which village residents are engaged, wage rates, income, nutrition and con-
sumption. Plus a number of the enumerators kept detailed diaries which are full of
qualitative data.
Palanpur is located in Moradabad district in Uttar Pradesh, around 205km from Delhi.
There is a train station in the village, evident in Figure 1.1, this line connects directly to
Delhi in around 6 hours. Although much closer are Chandausi 13km away, a town of
approximately 114,254; and Moradabad 31km away, the district capital with a population
18
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of 889,810.9 Not every train stops at the station, but many do - enough to allow villagers
the possibility to commute daily to Chandausi or Moradabad. Chandausi contains the
market at which most of Palanpur’s produce is sold. When it was rst surveyed Palan-
pur was a village of 534 people and has grown to one with a population of 1,299 by 2015.
The longevity of the data means that we observe in some instances four generations of
the same family. The details of this population growth by survey, as well as the corres-
ponding growth in the number of households is shown in Table 1.1.10 Also included in
Table 1.1 are details on the evolution over the course of the survey period of variables
relating to land holdings and usage, agriculture in the village, income and educational
attainment.
Noticeable in Table 1.1 is the growing importance of the non-farm sector, both as a
source of employment and income. In this thesis we dene the non-farm sector fol-
lowing Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001). Thus the non-farm ‘sector’ includes all economic
activities except agriculture, livestock, shing and hunting. Agricultural production re-
mains important in Palanpur throughout the 60 year survey period (in 2015 more than
70% of village households are still engaged in farming their own land), although the av-
erage area of land cultivated by village households has fallen considerably, as well as the
total area of land cultivated by village households. The average number of acres of land
owned by households is less than 30% of its original 1958 amount. All these landholdings
9Government of India (2011) - http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/data_les/India2/Table_2_PR_Cities_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf
10In most of the Palanpur work to date the village has 528 people in the 1958 survey spread among 100
households. This is because the original survey questionnaires are missing for 3 households. However,
all 3 are surveyed again in 1964 and report the households as unchanged. So while there is no data on
their income, debts, agricultural output etc. for 1958, we know how they relate to others in the village.
Since the focus of Chapter 3 is primarily the importance of networks we include these individuals since
they would still form part of other villagers networks in 1958. It is also possible that other populations
or estimates may dier from those previously calculated using the Palanpur data given that this thesis
is based on new cleaning and matching of the data. Any errors that remain are solely the responsibility
of the author.
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lie within 3km of the village.
Table 1.1 also demonstrates the growing importance of a market for land. This despite
leasing land being illegal (at least during some of the period) and illegally leased-out land
being liable to conscation. Individuals are still happy to be landlords and to talk about it
freely, Bliss and Stern (1982):p.24. Previous examinations of Palanpur have shown that
most tenancy in Palanpur takes the form of sharecropping, and also that households
are happy to lease “down caste ladder”, Bliss and Stern (1982):p.25. That is from high
caste households to lower or scheduled caste households, but not the other way round.
Leasing of land also takes place within caste. For a more detailed discussion of Caste in
Palanpur see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
The unique elements of the Palanpur data, aside from it’s longevity, are that the data
are collected as a census of the village, and it is possible to track how each household or
individual are related to each other, if at all. The data is taken as a series of snapshots of
the village over 60 years and there is no systematic attempt to create a timeline of events
which would enable the creation of a yearly panel from this data, since that was not the
purpose of the original studies.
However, due to the census nature of the data we know not only the individuals
present in the village who are enumerated in each survey. We also know about those
members of Palanpur who migrate out of the village, even if they are not present in
any survey. This is because households are asked about any members who are now not
present when they were in previous surveys, and also about any births in the household
in intervening years. Thus we know basic demographic information about everyone
who was at one time a member of the village, although we do not have income or em-
ployment data for those migrants who have left permanently. As a result the sample of
unique individuals who are present in at least one of the Palanpur surveys is 2,752, but
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the number of unique individuals in what we refer to as the migration sample is 2,831.
Despite being much poorer than India on average11, the development experience of
Palanpur over the last 60 years has been remarkably similar to that of India as a whole.
Village average real incomes per capita have increased at an annualised growth rate
above 1.5% per year from 1958 to 2009. Despite having a population in 2009 almost 1
million times smaller than India, in Chapter 2 we show that both India and Palanpur are
consistent with the stylised facts of structural transformation described by the literature
across countries12. That is, Palanpur has experienced large reallocations of resources
away from agriculture into other sectors. Table 1.1 shows this at the household level in
the large increase in households who are engaged in non-farm activities, together with
the increase in the percentage of income which comes from non-farm sources. Chapter 2
shows that this is also true for employment shares, in 1958 56.6% of males are employed
in agriculture as their primary occupation, by 2015 this is 17.3%. Together with, and
necessary for, this sectoral reallocation has been increasing agricultural productivity.
Table 1.1 illustrates this increase in productivity in terms of real output values, but it is
also true in yield terms. Cereal yields in kilograms per hectare increased from 559 in
1958 to 2,958 in 2009.
11The average income in the village in 2009 is below the Indian average GDP per capita of the early 1960s.
12See Herrendorf et al. (2014); Buera and Kaboski (2012b); Buera and Kaboski (2012a) for these stylised
facts across countries.
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Table 1.1.: Village Descriptives
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015
Demography
Population 534 583 793 968 1121 1246 1299
Households 103 106 117 143 193 233 213
Mean HH Size 5.18 5.50 6.78 6.77 5.81 5.35 6.10
Land
Total Land Cultivated 474.59 454.28 392.15 433.80 365.43 354.71 .
Land owned (acres)
by HH 4.48 4.17 3.60 2.91 1.95 1.35 1.28
% Landless HH 12.62 12.26 9.40 20.28 21.76 16.74 23.47
% Land Leased 9.95 11.94 23.59 34.27 26.44 37.95 .
Agricultural
% HHs in Non-Farm 16.50 26.42 39.32 60.84 45.08 60.94 57.75
% HHs in Own
Cultivation 82.52 87.74 79.49 66.43 66.32 71.67 70.42
% HHs in Agricultural
Labour 25.24 14.15 23.08 17.48 15.03 9.87 2.35
Land Productivity 118.59 128.03 280.69 273.68 . 400.21 .
Labour Productivity 365.70 412.32 871.96 510.82 . 555.53 .
Income
Real HH Income
Per Capita 190.36 211.46 278.87 235.42 . 413.52 .
Income: % Non-Farm 13.30 17.51 17.19 31.85 . 46.60 .
Education
Mean Max Education 1.39 1.86 2.10 2.45 2.66 2.83 3.19
Mean HH Education 1.11 1.28 1.29 1.37 1.54 1.73 1.96
% HHs Educated
Class 9+ 1.94 14.15 19.66 41.96 48.19 55.79 81.69
Note: Variable denitions are in Appendix Table A.1.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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1.3. Contributions of the Palanpur Data
We are not the rst to use the Palanpur data, and surely not the last. There are many pub-
lications which use at least some elements of the data, beginning with Ansari (1964) who
reports on the rst survey. The most comprehensive accounts of Palanpur are contained
in the two books published to date, Bliss and Stern (1982) and Lanjouw and Stern (1998),
and there is a third book which is forthcoming.
Bliss and Stern (1982) details the village over the rst three surveys, and is focused on
the functioning of rural markets and the behaviour of farmers. The great contribution of
this book, aside from beginning the creation of such a long run dataset, was to increase
the understanding of sharecropping contracts as a response to imperfect or missing input
markets. While Lanjouw and Stern (1998) focus primarily on what they describe as the
three main drivers of change in Palanpur - population growth, technological change in
agriculture, and increased employment opportunities outside the village - using surveys
up to and including 1993. However, they also document changes in poverty, inequality
and nutrition, plus the workings of the labour, tenancy and credit markets within the
village. The book contains more than we could possibly summarise here. The forthcom-
ing third book will extend this description of the village and its changes into the 21st
century.
In addition to these books, Palanpur has spawned a number of journal articles con-
cerning dierent aspects of rural life. Bliss and Stern (1978a) and Bliss and Stern (1978b)
made important contributions to early nutrition-based eciency wage theory and evid-
ence.
Lanjouw (1999) uses Palanpur data from the 1975 and 1984 surveys to estimate a gen-
eral equilibrium model of land leasing. This is then used to show that village markets are
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not complete or ecient, and that knowledge about the relative farming skill of farmers
is common information in the village.
Other papers have examined the experience of agricultural labourers within Palan-
pur. Baland et al. (1999) use Palanpur data to explain the coexistence of daily-wage and
piece-rate contracts in agriculture. Their key nding is that the most able and least able
labourers work on piece rates, as they can choose their own level of eort. Mukherjee
and Ray (1991) use Palanpur 1984 survey data to test the implications of their model of
wage bargaining of agricultural labourers in the presence of seasonality.
Sharma and Drèze (1996) present a case study based on the census of tenancy contracts
collected as part of the 1984 survey. They make a contribution to the understanding of
sharecropping as the predominant tenancy arrangements in rural India.
Himanshu et al. (2013) and Himanshu, Joshi et al. (2016) document the increasing di-
versication of household incomes associated with non-farm employment. They show
that this increase in non-farm employment has been accompanied by increasing inequal-
ity and mobility, as well as falling poverty rates.
Relatedly there have also been contributions to the study of inequality from the Pa-
lanpur data. Lanjouw and Rao (2011) highlight the aws in standard between group
inequality measurement using caste groups in Palanpur. They show that caste is an im-
portant determinant of inequality within the village, and this inequality does not seem
to be driven by education or land endowment dierences across castes.
There are also a series of more recent working papers which focus on dierent ele-
ments of village life up to the 2009 survey: Agriculture (Himanshu and Tyagi (2011a)),
Tenancy (Himanshu and Tyagi (2011b)), Education (Kattumuri and Tiwari (2011)), Non-
farm Diversication (Himanshu, Lanjouw, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2011)), Poverty, In-
equality and Mobility (Himanshu, Bakshi et al. (2011a)), Women in Palanpur (Sinha and
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Coppoletta (2011)), and Nutrition (Sinha (2011)).
The Palanpur data also contribute three chapters to Himanshu, Jha et al. (2016) which
endeavours to document the history and results of village studies in India, beginning
with the “Slater villages” in Tamil Nadu in 1916.
1.4. Employment in Palanpur
Historically the villagers of Palanpur, like any other village in rural India, relied on sub-
sistence agriculture for their livelihood. However, as we have seen in the previous sec-
tion, the importance of non-agricultural sources of income has been growing.
The change in occupational structure in Palanpur has mainly come through an in-
crease in the opportunities outside the village. The percentage of males of 18 or over
working outside the village increased from 6.2% in 1958 to 35.9% in 2015. While the per-
centage of males of 18 or over working in non-agricultural pursuits within the village has
increased from 11.1% to 21.9%. Many of the jobs outside the village have emerged in lar-
ger villages or the towns of Moradabad and Chandausi, 31kms and 14kms away respect-
ively. These jobs have developed as the towns have increased in size. Moradabad, the
district capital, was just over 200,000 people in 197513, approximately 444,000 people in
the 1991 census, and had grown to almost 900,000 people in the 2011 census. Chandausi,
while smaller than Moradabad, has also grown signicantly during the last 60 years14.
It is also the primary market for agricultural products from Palanpur. Both Moradabad
and Chandausi are on the train line which runs through Palanpur. As of 2017 there are 5
trains a day to Moradabad and 4 trains a day to Chandausi from Palanpur. The journey
13Bliss and Stern (1982)
14Chandausi population: 83000, 1991: 103,757, 2001: 114,383, 2011 from Census data. Estimated 1961
population 45,000 from supplement to the Gazette of India, September 16, 1961.
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times are between 30 mins (to Chandausi) and 1 hour and 10 mins (to Moradabad). Thus,
they allow for members of Palanpur to commute to either of these towns. Himanshu,
Joshi et al. (2016) discuss the eect of this employment outside Palanpur on others in
the village “A common perception among the villagers was that employment outside of
Palanpur was denitely more remunerative than in Palanpur, as the living standards of
these families had improved. This also served as a source of inspiration for many oth-
ers who wanted to go out of the village in search of employment.” This impression is
supported by the available wage data. For example, in 2009 an individual working in
agricultural labour within the village would earn Rs. 100 per day for their labour, while
work in the Moradabad railway yard would earn them, on average, Rs. 200 per day. This
is not a skilled form of employment, but is a popular form of casual labour undertaken
by village residents.
There is an important distinction to be drawn at this point about the types of jobs
which are available to Palanpur residents. The key distinction is that of employment
being “regular”. To a rst approximation a regular job is one which involves monthly
rather than daily wage payments. These jobs are sought after since they oer numerous
benets. “Employees with such jobs usually enjoy a modicum of employment security,
and, in most cases, substantially higher earnings than casual labourers.” Lanjouw and
Stern (1998):p.128. Examples of these regular jobs in which members of Palanpur are
employed are factory work (steel, textiles, cement, biscuits), teaching, bank cashier, in-
surance agent, railway employee. These jobs form a signicant proportion of all jobs; the
percentage of adult males who are present in the village in regular employment across
all surveys is 14.0%. The rate of employment in these jobs has not risen a great deal
during the survey period, from 7.4% to 10.7%. However, this disguises a hump-shape in
regular employment rates which peaks in 1984 at 21.7%. The explanation for this feature
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is not clear, although one obvious candidate is changing migration rates for those who
are more likely to become regular workers.
The type and location of employment of Palanpur residents are not independent. In
fact, 71.3% of all regular jobs done by an adult Palanpur resident in any survey are outside
the village.
1.5. Education in Palanpur
Education in Palanpur, much like education across the whole of India, has risen substan-
tially throughout the survey period. India’s primary completion rate was 98% in 2014,
up from 40% in 197115. For Palanpur it is not possible to generate comparable numbers
since we do not have enrolment, only self-reported schooling. We can calculate the per-
centage of Palanpur residents aged between 12 and 18 who are educated to class 6 or
above (primary ends after class 5). This increases from 25.8% in 1958 to 45.8% in 2015.
There has been much discussion about whether this increase in enrolment rates across
India has led to real increases in educational attainment, see Bosworth et al. (2006) for
example. The same concerns are held anecdotally within Palanpur. In all the following
we abstract from educational quality and focus only on education completed. We will
however focus primarily at the high end of educational achievement and create an in-
dicator variable, since the distinction between 5 and 7 years of schooling, for example,
is not likely to be important in this context.
Measures of education are self-reported school years in the Palanpur data, and to allow
for comparability across all surveys these data are collapsed into bins of education level
- illiterate, class 1 to 5, class 6 to 8, class 9 to 12, class 12 or above. For those individuals
15UNESCO Institute for Statistics - SE.PRM.CMPT.ZS variable.
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Table 1.2.: Male Education in Palanpur by Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015
% Illiterate 80.00 73.10 70.34 62.63 50.97 29.70 21.65
% Class 1 to 5 12.78 12.69 11.44 6.40 8.08 23.10 24.33
% Class 6 to 8 3.89 7.11 8.05 12.79 15.88 19.04 18.97
% Class 9 to 12 1.11 6.09 6.36 16.16 20.89 23.10 25.00
% > Class 12 0.00 1.02 3.39 2.02 1.95 5.08 8.26
% Missing Education 2.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 2.23 0.00 1.79
Individuals 180 197 236 297 359 394 448
Note: Percentage of males over 14 years of age by education level and survey.
Only those present in Palanpur are included.
Source: Author’s Calculations
who appear as 14 or older in at least one survey, 16.2% of them are educated to class
9 or above. This overall number hides important dierences between the educational
attainment by sex. Males who appear in at least one survey when older than 14 are over
5 times more likely to be educated to class 9 than equivalent females, 27.5% and 5.4%
respectively. A more detailed look at the education of Palanpur is contained in Table 1.2
for males, and Table 1.3 for females. These tables both show strong increasing trends in
literacy16.
There is a complication when considering the educational attainment of the females
in Palanpur. Due to the process of patrilocal exogamy, and early marriages in this part
of India, many girls born in Palanpur disappear from the education sample before they
have their nal education enumerated. For example, someone who appears as an 8 year
old in the 1975 survey and gets married at 16, moving to their new husband’s village, will
16This is true even if we assume all individuals with missing educational data are illiterate.
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not appear in the 1984 survey. So we would not capture her nal education level. Thus,
many of the women we sample are those educated in other villages or towns who move
in when they marry a Palanpur male. While the level of education of these women and
the nature of assortative matching are interesting questions in themselves, they are not
the ones we focus on in this thesis. As such, we will mostly be restricting our samples
to males in what follows.
A complication remains when we are considering male educational attainment, that is
of migration. If migration is selective and migration patterns change over time then we
are not capturing the true trends in education for those born in Palanpur, but for those
living in the village. We discuss the nature of migration in Palanpur in the following
section.
Table 1.3.: Female Education in Palanpur by Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015
% Illiterate 96.18 98.84 93.36 93.23 87.96 75.70 59.95
% Class 1 to 5 1.27 0.58 3.79 3.01 2.16 11.25 16.35
% Class 6 to 8 0.00 0.00 1.42 1.50 5.25 7.93 8.53
% Class 9 to 12 0.00 0.58 0.00 2.26 2.78 3.84 4.27
% > Class 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 1.02 1.66
% Missing Education 2.55 0.00 1.42 0.00 1.23 0.26 9.24
Individuals 157 173 211 266 324 391 422
Note: Percentage of females over 14 years of age by education level and survey.
Only those present in Palanpur are included.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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1.6. Migration in Palanpur
As in all rural development settings, migration is a key feature of Palanpur society. 32.7%
of adult males have migrated out of Palanpur in at least one survey. Foster and Rosenz-
weig (2008) nd 21.2% of males aged between 10-24 in 1982 migrate out of their village
between 1982 and 2002 in Bangladesh17. Using the NCAER REDS survey for India they
nd 23.7% of males aged between 10-24 in 1982 migrate out of their village by 1999. Table
1.4 shows the results of the same calculations when performed on the Palanpur data. We
nd that for periods roughly similar to the 17-20 year periods looked at by Foster and
Rosenzweig (2008) the migration percentage for males in Palanpur ranges from 14.7% to
32.2%, with a clearly increasing trend.
Table 1.4.: Percentage of Out-Migrants
1958-1975 1964-1984 1975-1993 1993-2009
Male 14.67 17.39 22.76 32.22
Female 51.72 51.61 55.91 72.07
Note: Includes individuals present in Palanpur who are aged 10-
24 in the earlier of the two surveys examined, who have left
Palanpur by the later survey.
Source: Author’s Calculations
Table 1.4 also shows the same calculations done for females aged between 10-24 in
Palanpur between the same surveys. These range between 51.6% and 72.1%, percentages
which are also in line with those from Foster and Rosenzweig (2008). They nd that 56.3%
of equivalent females in Bangladesh migrate out of their villages, while in India it was
86.9%. These numbers are unsurprisingly higher than for males due to the practice of
patrilocal exogamy - females move to the village of their husband when they get married.
17Using the Bangladesh Nutrition Surveys of 1982 and 2002.
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However, the percentage of females leaving the village appears to have increased in more
recent years. This may be because females are now not just migrating for marriage but
also for employment or educational opportunities, or it may be that there is an increase
in the number of households who are migrating out of the village en masse and this
includes females who previously would have remained in the village. Table 1.5 shows the
number of households which migrate out of Palanpur as a collective between surveys.
This appears to indicate that it is this increased propensity for households to migrate
out between 1993 and 2009 which has led to the sharp increase in female migration seen
between 1975-1993 and 1993-2009 in Table 1.4. No doubt this increased propensity for
collective household migration also explains some of the increase in the male migration
rates between these two surveys. However, it is impossible for us to disentangle these
increases into individual and collective migration since we do not have information on
the migration destinations of all individuals.
Table 1.5.: Households Migrating Out
1958-1964 1964-1975 1975-1984 1984-1993 1993-2009 2009-2015
Households 8 14 6 13 39 21
Individuals 21 52 18 78 204 122
Note: Households: Unique households which migrate out of the village as a whole. In-
dividuals: Number of unique individuals within these migrating households.
Source: Author’s Calculations
Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) nd in their samples that out-migration is selective
with respect to schooling. In both countries they examine the schooling attainment (in
years) is higher for migrants than non-migrants. In the Palanpur data however, at least
initially, it appears that non-migrants have higher educational attainment. Table 1.6
shows mean education for males between 15-24 in an initial survey by migration status
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of these individuals during a later survey. As shown above there is an increasing trend in
educational attainment irrespective of migration status. However, this increasing trend
seems to be much stronger for migrants than non-migrants. The result of this is that
despite non-migrants having higher educational attainment in earlier surveys, by the
most recent surveys it is migrants who have marginally higher education levels. This
is interesting as it suggests the nature of migration out of the village may be changing
during the study period. However, these results should be interpreted with caution since
Wilcoxon and Fisher exact tests fail to reject a dierence in the means and medians of
these two groups for each pair of surveys considered.
Table 1.6.: Education by Migration Status
1958-1975 1964-1984 1975-1993 1993-2009
Migrants 1.13 1.33 2.50 2.67
Non-migrants 1.93 2.20 2.47 2.56
Note: Includes males present in Palanpur who are aged 15-24 in
the earlier of the two surveys examined. Migrants are those
who have left by the later survey, non-migrants are those who
are still present in the village. Education is measured in years
completed, collapsed into 5 categories (Illiterate, Class 1-5,
Class 6-8, Class 9-12, Above Class 12). These categories are
given numerical values in order of attainment (e.g. Illiterate is
1). The table reports mean education by migration status.
Source: Author’s Calculations
1.7. Summary
Palanpur is not very dierent to thousands of other Indian villages. The major dierence
has been the presence of investigators intermittently over 60 years which has provided
us with a unique opportunity to study the development of India. From a young post-
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colonial democracy to the rapidly expanding service-led economy of the present day.
This chapter has demonstrated how Palanpur has evolved through this process, and
how it is not a peculiar village in any obvious way. We have shown that the changes
in employment, education and migration patterns are broadly consistent with data from
other sources for India. With this in mind we now progress to using these data to tackle
two questions of central importance to our understanding of economic development
which can only be answered with data of this length and detail.
Chapter 2 examines the process of structural transformation within Palanpur, how
this compares to sectoral reallocation as documented in the literature at a national level,
and what this can tell us about structural transformation in development more generally.
In chapter 3 we explore the importance of networks within the village labour market in
light of this movement away from agriculture, and the long run eects of these networks
for their members.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1.: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
Population Individuals who are living in the village during the survey
Households Households with any members living in the village during thesurvey
Total Land Cultivated Land cultivated, in acres, by households who are present inthe village during the respective survey
Land owned (acres)
by HH
Land owned, in acres, by households who are present in the
village
% Landless HHs Percentage of households which own no land
% Land Leased Land leased in by households present in the village aspercentage of total land cultivated by village residents
% HHs in Non-Farm
Percentage of households which have at least one member
present in the village who works in a primary or secondary
occupation which is in the non-farm sector
% HHs in Own
Cultivation
Percentage of households which have at least one member
present in the village who cultivates land owned or leased
by the household
% HHs in Agricultural
Labour
Percentage of households which have at least one member
present in the village who works for a wage in agriculture
Land Productivity Real value of agricultural output (in 1960 Rupees) per acreof land cultivated
Labour Productivity Real value of agricultural output (in 1960 Rupees) peragricultural worker (cultivator or labourer)
Real HH Income Per
Capita
Real household income per household member present in the
village
Income: % Non-Farm Percentage of household income from non-farm sources
Mean Max Education Maximum level of education achieved by any individual presentin HH averaged across all households present in year
Mean HH Education Mean level of education within HH, averaged across allhouseholds present in year
% HHs Educated Class 9+ The percentage of households present in the village whichhave at least one member who is educated at or above class 9
Education
Education is coded as 1-5. 1: Illiterate, 2: Able to
read/write OR education between class 1 and 5, 3: Education
between class 6 and 8, 4: Education between class 9 and 12,
5: Education beyond class 12
Note: Variable denitions for variables included in Table 1.1.
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Chapter 2
The Fractal Nature of Structural Transformation
Structural transformation, the reallocation of economic activity from agricul-
ture to manufacturing and services, is one of the most pervasive features of eco-
nomic development. A vast literature exists on this phenomenon for countries,
and there is a more limited microeconomic literature on the linkages between
agricultural development and non-agricultural development. However, to our
knowledge there is no evidence on how the nature and experience of structural
transformation diers for entities smaller than nations. In this chapter we ex-
amine the experience of a village, a district, a state and a country in light of
the stylised facts of structural transformation in the cross-country literature.
We show that the pattern of sectoral reallocation is strikingly similar and con-
sistent with the extant stylised facts at all levels. This, as yet undocumented,
feature of structural transformation has important implications for sectoral
complementarity and development policy.
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2.1. Introduction
Structural transformation is one of the most widely studied phenomena in the history
of Economics as an academic discipline. From the seminal contributions of Lewis (1954),
the observations of Kuznets (1973), through to modern contributions such as Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) - there innumerable papers concerning structural transformation
in the macroeconomic literature. Equally many observers have noted the increasing
importance of the non-agricultural sector in rural areas of developing countries, see
Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) for a cross-country review. However, to our knowledge,
no attempt has been made to reconcile these macro and micro ndings explicitly, and
the microeconomic foundations of the transition from an agricultural economy to an
industrial economy are not especially well understood. Thus, in this chapter we ask
how similar the experience of structural transformation is at dierent geographical and
population levels. Does a country experience structural transformation in the same way
as a village, a district or a state?
It seems to be commonly accepted in the economics literature that structural trans-
formation and urbanisation are simply two sides of the same coin, and that movement
out of agriculture must occur in unison with rural-urban migration. The occurrence
of these two features together is obviously reasonable, and such coincidence is suppor-
ted by a number of papers (e.g. Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014); Michaels et al. (2012);
Young (2013)). However, rural-urban migration is not a necessary feature of develop-
ment. The locus of economic activity need not change just because individuals get richer,
even if the nature of the economic activity changes. We show an important example of a
setting where development has not been accompanied by mass emigration. Individuals
change sector of employment from agriculture into manufacturing or services but they
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remain resident in a rural area.
In this thesis we dene structural transformation as the reallocation of economic activ-
ity across agriculture, manufacturing and services. This structural transformation is
characterised by Kuznets (1973) as “Major aspects of structural change include the shift
away from agriculture to non-agricultural pursuits and, recently, away from industry
to services; a change in the scale of productive units, and a related shift from personal
enterprise to impersonal organization of economic rms, with a corresponding change
in the occupational status of labor.” We examine these features of structural transform-
ation, in light of more recent cross-country work by Herrendorf et al. (2014); Buera and
Kaboski (2012b); Buera and Kaboski (2012a), for the village of Palanpur, the district of
Moradabad, the state of Uttar Pradesh and the country of India. We follow the macroe-
conomic literature on structural transformation by using manufacturing to refer to the
sector of the economy which does not include agriculture or services.1
The focus of our study is India. Structural transformation in India has been docu-
mented by Bosworth et al. (2006) and Verma (2012), among others, who use a growth
accounting framework to examine the contribution of broad sectors to overall growth in
India GDP from 1960-2004. Their ndings are consistent with the description of struc-
tural transformation by Kuznets above. They emphasise the service led growth of India
from 1980 onwards, but Bosworth et al. (2006) argue that the role of services in the In-
dian growth experience is overstated. Bosworth and Collins (2008) compare the growth
experience of India to that of China.
However, even if we know that at the country level there is a sectoral shift away from
agriculture it does not necessarily follow that we will see comparable reallocations at all
1Strictly speaking it is probably more proper to refer to this sector as industry (as do the World Devel-
opment Indicators, World Bank (Various years)) and consider manufacturing to be simply the largest
part of this sector. However, the convention is long established.
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levels of the economy. If agricultural and non-agricultural development are substitutes
then it may be that smaller geographic areas specialise in the sector in which they have
comparative advantage. We would then expect to see dierential patterns in structural
transformation for dierent snapshots of the economy. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004);
Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) use a sample of households in villages in rural India who
are surveyed three times in a 28 year period to explore the relationship between growth
in agricultural technology and the non-farm sector. They nd large increases in income
from the non-farm sector in their villages, and that these increases are largest where ag-
ricultural productivity growth is smallest. This is consistent with the nding from Bustos
et al. (2016) who show that the adoption of a land-augmenting technology in Brazil led
to a reduction in the industrial sector, while in contrast the adoption of labour-saving
agricultural technology led to growth in the industrial sector. Thus, if it is agricultural
productivity growth which is the driving force behind this sectoral reallocation then
the spatial distribution of sectors, and therefore the congruence of sub-samples of this
changing economy, will depend on the factor-bias of the technical change2.
Our examination of structural transformation at the village level uses data from Pa-
lanpur. The Palanpur data are uniquely suited to this purpose as they cover an extremely
long time period, from 1957 to 2015. These 60 years span a period of rapid change and
development within India. The other feature of the Palanpur data which allows us to
explore structural transformation at the village level is that it was undertaken as a full
census of the village. Usual panel data, particularly in rural areas of developing coun-
tries, face the dual challenges of (selective) attrition and household division. Most survey
designs do not retain in their sample any or some sub-divisions of households which do
2See Gollin et al. (2002) andGollin et al. (2007) for models in which agricultural productivity growth is
central to structural transformation.
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not remain intact between survey rounds. These household divisions are not uncommon:
in the ARIS-REDS panel data 30% of the original sample farm households had divided by
the time of resampling 12 years later3. In the Palanpur data 64% of the original survey
households have split at least once. Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) show using the ARIS-
REDS panel data for a representative sample of rural India that this household division is
non-random. It depends, for example, on land holdings, within household inequality in
schooling, and marriages. Thus if one examines the nature of structural transformation
using a typical survey which samples households within villages then this non-random
nature of division, and therefore attrition, will lead to biased estimates of the relative
sizes of sectors. The Palanpur data avoid this problem because all household splits are
sampled in subsequent surveys as long as they remain in the village. Due to the nature
of the survey we observe who migrates out of the village but do not observe their out-
comes. However, this is the same as when we examine sectoral distributions at any level
of aggregation - those who emigrate from India are no longer captured in the data for
sectoral allocations at the country level. It is also true of most household surveys in
developing countries which do not specically focus on migration.
We combine our data on Palanpur with sector level data for Moradabad district, Uttar
Pradesh and India. Armed with these data we compare the nature of structural trans-
formation for each of these geographic areas with the stylised facts documented for
cross-country data by Herrendorf et al. (2014).
We show that where the data are available these stylised facts hold true at all levels.
The share of total employment which is agricultural has declined for India, Uttar Pra-
desh, Moradabad district and Palanpur. Agricultural productivity has increased. Income
3The Additional Rural Incomes Survey and Rural Economic and Demographic Survey conducted by
the National Council of Applied Economic Research. See Foster and Rosenzweig (2002); Foster and
Rosenzweig (2004) or the NCAER website for details of this panel: http://www.ncaer.org/data.php
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per capita has risen. Economic activity has relocated from agriculture into both man-
ufacturing and service sectors within Palanpur. For low levels of development this in-
crease in the growth of manufacturing is faster than for services, and the employment
share of services is bounded away from zero - both of these features are found in the
cross-country data. We also nd that the ratio of the manufacturing and service sectors
evolves in a way which is strikingly similar to the cross-country averages as described
in Buera and Kaboski (2012a). The manufacturing sector initially grows faster than the
service sector, but the continuing expansion of the service sector eventually reduces the
ratio - resulting in a hump-shape. The novel observation that this occurs even within
a village economy seems to run counter to the prevailing perception in the literature
which focuses on services as the principal component of non-farm employment in rural
areas.
The results of this chapter are consistent with the agricultural technological change
experienced by India, and its component parts, via the Green Revolution being labour-
saving. Our ndings also suggest that agricultural and non-agricultural development are
complements. This complementarity is in contrast to the results of Foster and Rosenz-
weig (2004); Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) who nd that agricultural and non-agricultural
growth are substitutes. This complementarity means that development policies aimed
at increasing agricultural productivity aid non-agricultural development which is im-
portant because non-agriculture is the more productive sector. This suggests that the
large amounts of money spent on agricultural technological innovations and higher pro-
ductivity crops have improved the incomes of many of the world’s rural poor. However,
our focus is a single village and we must learn how widespread the features of local
development documented here are before we can draw strong policy conclusions.
This chapter contributes to the literature by forming a bridge between the microe-
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conomic studies of the process of development, such as those reviewed in Foster and
Rosenzweig (2008), and the vast macroeconomic and theoretical literatures which build
upon the models of those such as Matsuyama (1992) to examine the nature of develop-
ment at the national level. To our knowledge this is the rst explicit examination of the
nature of structural transformation at the level of a single village. The unique nature of
the Palanpur data enables us to conduct this exercise.
We believe this chapter contributes to a nascent literature on the spatial dimension of
the exit of rural workers from agriculture. Our description of India through the devel-
opment experience suggests that there exist rural areas of developing countries where
it is not a relocation of from rural to urban environments, but rather a reallocation of
sectoral activity within rural areas. This illustrates the important distinction between
urbanisation and structural transformation. While the two are clearly related concepts
(Michaels et al. (2012)), and urbanisation may be the consequence of structural trans-
formation if there are agglomeration externalities, they are distinct economic phenom-
ena. In a context such as this it is therefore not necessary for there to be rural-urban
migration together with reduced agricultural activity. It appears that the existence of ad-
equate transport infrastructure and suciently local manufacturing or services allows
development of the non-agricultural sector without large migrant ows. This is consist-
ent with the large rural-urban wage gap and low mobility which are a feature of India,
Chauvin et al. (2017); Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016).
Related to this is another strand of the literature which considers transport costs, in-
frastructure and development. Gollin and Rogerson (2014) calibrate a model to answer
policy questions about the impact of transport costs on structural transformation.4 Their
4They model location and occupation type as perfect complements, and thus don’t distinguish urban-
isation and structural transformation, however the intuition of their model will still hold if we allow
rural workers to live and work in dierent regions.
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model suggests that the extent of structural transformation is driven by improvements
in agricultural productivity and transportation productivity, and these productivity im-
provements are complementary.5 While there have been improvements in the transport-
ation infrastructure around Palanpur during the study period, mostly through improved
road quality in surrounding areas, it has always had access to the railway network. This
relatively good transportation infrastructure, and corresponding relatively low transport
costs, may be an important explanatory factor in Palanpur’s structural transformation
experience in the face of increasing agricultural productivity. If there were more compar-
able data to the Palanpur data it would be interesting to see whether this fractal nature
of structural transformation holds in all settings, or if there is heterogeneity by village
transportation infrastructure (or travel time to nearest urban location). If this feature of
fractal structural transformation is common only to those areas with suciently good
transport infrastructure then this suggests that existing estimates of the impact of trans-
port infrastructure (e.g. Donaldson (2018); Michaels (2008)) may be underestimates since
they do not include the long run general equilibrium increases in local incomes which
come through sectoral reallocation.
This result has implications for development policies. It is suggestive of a policy av-
enue to reduce rural poverty through reducing the urban-rural wage gap and overcome
the low levels of migration in India compared with other countries of similar levels of de-
velopment (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)) - increased transport infrastructure allows
rural areas to benet from more productive non-agricultural pursuits in urban centres,
while allowing individuals to remain part of their traditional rural social insurance net-
works which constrain usual forms of migration.
5Other papers which examine the importance of transport costs in development include Atkin and Don-
aldson (2015); Herrendorf et al. (2012); Storeygard (2016).
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The following section describes the stylised facts of structural transformation from
the cross-country literature, and the data we use. We then examine how well these styl-
ised facts t the data for India (in section 2.3), Uttar Pradesh (in section 2.4), Moradabad
District (in section 2.5), and Palanpur (in section 2.6). Section 2.7 discusses the simil-
arities and dierences in the development experience of each of the geographic areas.
Finally section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Stylised Facts and Data
It has long been recognised, starting with the seminal work of Lewis (1954), that struc-
tural transformation - the reallocation of economic activity across agriculture, manufac-
turing and services - is one of the most pervasive elements of economic development.
Kuznets (1973) listed it as the third of six main features of modern economic growth. This
transition away from agriculture is necessary because individual demand for agricul-
tural goods is relatively price and income-inelastic as incomes increase, and because of
the presence of land as a xed factor in agricultural production which limits its capacity
for labour. Herrendorf et al. (2014) present the stylised facts of structural transformation
using cross-country data from a variety of sources and nd that it is characterised by: the
share of agriculture in total employment, value added, and nal consumption expendit-
ure falling with development; the share of services in total employment, value added,
and nal consumption expenditure rising with development; the share of manufactur-
ing in total employment, value added, and nal consumption expenditure is n-shaped
(or hump-shaped) with development.
In addition to these broad sectoral shifts Herrendorf et al. (2014) show that for low
levels of development the value added share in agriculture is considerably lower than
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the employment share. In the service sector both the employment share and the nominal
value added share are bounded away from zero even at very low levels of development;
the lowest value added share of services is around 20% and the lowest employment share
is around 10%. This is consistent with work by Broadberry et al. (2013) who show that
even in 14thcentury Britain the share of male workers in the service sector was just below
20%6.
Equally it is clear that, at the level of the world, agricultural productivity growth is
essential for sustained economic development. Increases in agricultural productivity
which are labour-saving lead to industrial growth (Bustos et al. (2016)). Additionally, the
work of Buera and Kaboski (2012b) shows an acceleration in the rate of relative growth
of the service sector in the later stages of the process of structural transformation. Buera
and Kaboski (2012b) document this stylised fact for a panel of 31 countries, who use 9,200
in 1990 international dollars as their threshold, based on evidence from the United States.
They argue that this acceleration in the share of services at higher incomes appears to be
a common feature of structural transformation, and that it is driven by growth in skill-
intensive services. This feature is consistent with the ndings of Herrendorf et al. (2014),
who show that this acceleration in the service sector share tends to coincide with the
peak manufacturing share. In their data this threshold occurs at approximately a log
GDP per capita of 9 in 1990 international dollars, which is 8,103 in 1990 international
dollars.
Buera and Kaboski (2012a) describe a new stylised fact in their panel of countries, that
for low levels of GDP per capita the manufacturing sector expands more quickly than
does the service sector. They show the average ratio of manufacturing to services share
in value added increases from below 0.2 to a peak of approximately 0.75 before declining
6For females this share was even higher.
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again as the manufacturing share declines past the threshold described above.
2.2.1. Data
When trying to examine structural transformation across countries data comparability
is one of the primary issues faced. This is no less complicated when trying to document
features of this transformation across dierent geographical areas. Although since we
are looking within a country we do not need to focus on accurate purchasing power
parity adjusted estimates.
In the structural transformation literature employment shares are typically calculated
using hours worked by sector. We cannot employ these measures due to data availability
at lower levels of disaggregation. Hence, we focus on workers by sector and abstract
from hours worked. This ignores possible changing patterns of hours worked by level
of development, and may mean that our employment shares do not exactly match the
percentage of labour inputs employed in each sector. This could be an issue if the hours
worked in agriculture change dierentially by area in consideration. However, we have
no reason to believe this is happening within a single country.
Given concerns about the under-representation of female employment in the Palanpur
data, and that this under-representation is probably most prevalent in the agricultural
sector, we use the percentage of male workers working in agriculture from the total male
population when examining employment shares.
To allow for comparability of our agricultural employment share numbers across
levels of aggregation, we use data from the Census of India, a decadal census last con-
ducted in 2011, from which we have obtained population, cultivator and agricultural
labourer counts for India, Uttar Pradesh and Moradabad district. We sum those who
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work as cultivators or agricultural labourers to generate the total number of workers in
the agricultural sector, and population to construct a percentage share. As we use total
population and not number of workers as is typical within the literature, the numbers
we will nd will be lower than one might expect. However, we take advantage of estim-
ates of the labour force participation rate to show these numbers are comparable with
those in the literature when we inate them.
We use this same narrow denition of agricultural employment for the Palanpur data.
We count only those who are employed in cultivating their own land, or who work
as agricultural labourers. There exist at all levels a number of services, many of which
relate to agriculture. One example of this type of service within Palanpur is tractor rental.
So while the labour of the tractor owner is engaged in the supporting the agricultural
sector and increasing its productivity, it is not counted in the gures for agricultural
employment. However, in constructing our employment data in this way we allow for
direct comparability across all levels of observation.
Within the cross-country literature both production and consumption measures of
sectoral shares are used, value added shares and nal consumption expenditure shares
respectively7. The decision for us over which measure to use is made easy, since there
are no data on nal consumption expenditure shares for any of our levels of interest.
Therefore, we use production measures of sectoral shares in what follows. Data on In-
dian sectoral shares of GDP come from the Indian National Accounts produced by the
Indian Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) via Reserve Bank of India (2016-17), these
are measured at current prices at factor cost.8 For Uttar Pradesh we use estimates of state
7Herrendorf et al. (2014) show where these two dierent measures can give dierent quantitative results,
particularly for the manufacturing sector.
8See Bosworth et al. (2006) for a detailed description on the construction of India’s GDP and sectoral
share estimates.
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domestic product and the percentage of state domestic product by sector from Ozler et
al. (1996) for 1961-1993 and data from the CSO from 1994 onwards. There are no GDP
or income estimates available at the district level for Moradabad. At the village level the
Palanpur survey measures income in 5 of the 7 surveys. Therefore we use percentage of
income from cultivation as a measure of the relative size of the agricultural sector.
Agricultural yield data for India for 1961-2014 come from the World Bank (Various
years) World Development Indicators9. Detailed information on crop yields in Palanpur
are collected in the 1958, 1963, 1975, 1984 and 2009 surveys. For comparability with
other data sources we use only the yields and cultivated area from the farming of wheat,
Bajra (pearl millet) and Paddy - the cereal crops which are grown in the village - to
calculate cereal yields in kilograms per hectare. Land productivity measures for cereal
for Uttar Pradesh and Moradabad come from ICRISAT (2015), again in kilograms per
hectare. These are available from 1966-2011.
One of the stylised facts described in Herrendorf et al. (2014) is the n-shaped trend in
the share of manufacturing, both in terms of employment and income shares. Due to
data constraints it is hard to examine these manufacturing shares at levels below that of
a country. However, we have coded occupations for the Palanpur data as manufacturing
or services. Thus we will use these employment shares to consider the existence of this
hump-shape in manufacturing. We do not expect a pronounced hump since Palanpur is
not yet at the level of development needed to reach the peak of manufacturing employ-
ment share, typically over a log GDP per capita of 9 (in 1990 international dollars)10 in
the cross-country data. A comparison of the price level between countries and villages
is inherently dicult and unreliable. Bearing this in mind, log GDP per capita of 9 is
9using series AG.YLD.CREL.KG
10Herrendorf et al. (2014)
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8,103 in 1990 international dollars, while the village average income in 2009 (the highest
observed) is approximately 688 in 1990 international dollars11, well below the observed
threshold in the data. Thus, we should not see any decline in the manufacturing sector
share even if the pattern is consistent with the cross-country data. In fact, in the Mad-
dison 2018: Bolt et al. (2018) dataset India has yet to reach this level of GDP per capita
by 2016.
2.3. India
We now turn our attention to the development experience of India. Due to the work of
Sivasubramoniam (2000) there is long time-series of comparable data on sectoral shares
available for India. These data are available for 1900-2000. Combining this with estim-
ates of per capita GDP from Maddison (2010) we can see from Figure 2.1 that India’s
experience is in many ways typical of a country during the process of development. The
value added share of agriculture in current prices is initially above 50% but as Indian per
capita income grows this share falls to below half of its 1900 level. This activity moves
out of agriculture into both manufacturing and service sectors. However, consistent with
the cross-country stylised facts the manufacturing sector expands more quickly than the
services sector for low levels of development. For the rst 40 years of the sample the an-
nualised growth rate of the manufacturing share is around 3%, while that of services is
0.7%. As India has developed this manufacturing sector growth rate has slowed, while
the service sector has kept growing. We also observe, consistent with the cross-country
evidence, that the service share is strongly bounded away from zero even at the lowest
11Using the World Bank International Comparison Program Database and the CPI for India from the WDI.
1 1990 International dollar is worth 5.417 1990 Indian Rupees at PPP. Consumer Price Index for India
from WDI - 1960 = 2.58792717, 1990 = 22.8740634
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levels of development. In fact Broadberry et al. (2015) estimate a non-zero service sector
share in 1600.
Next we examine the experience of India over the last 60 years, a timeline comparable
with the Palanpur data. We nd, using the World Bank World Development Indicators
(WDI) and CSO data, that since 1960 India has been characterised by increasing pop-
ulation and agricultural productivity, falling agricultural land per capita and a smaller
share of workers employed in agriculture. All while experiencing four fold increase in
real GDP per capita. Figure 2.3 panel 3 shows this increase in GDP per capita (in constant
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2009 Rupees). Over this period India has been one of the fastest growing economies in
the world. Much has been written about the liberalisation undertaken by India begin-
ning in 199112 leading to this increased growth, although graphically it seems that the
increased growth rate predates these reforms. This is consistent with the ndings of
Aghion et al. (2008), who examine the dismantling of the license raj beginning in 1985,
and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004), who argue that growth was triggered in the 1980s
by a shift to a pro-business approach by the national government.
India’s agricultural productivity has risen dramatically throughout the period, see Fig-
ure 2.4 Panel 4. This threefold increase in cereal yields (kilograms per hectare) clearly
starts in the mid-1960s with the work of Norman Borlaug and the Green revolution, and
has continued unabated with the introduction of further high-yielding varieties. Con-
currently the agricultural value added per hectare has increased from 15,212 rupees to
77,263 rupees (constant 2009 rupees) between 1961-2010, an annualised growth rate of
3.37%.
Thus during this period we see India has increased incomes and agricultural pro-
ductivity rapidly, so we would expect it to also be undergoing a shift of resources out
of agriculture and into other sectors. Using data from Reserve Bank of India (2016-17)
for 1959-2011, Figure 2.2 Panel 1 illustrates the reduction in income share (in current
prices) from agricultural sources: India has experienced a 26 percentage point fall in
agricultural sector share. Along with this reduction, Figure 2.2 shows the contempor-
aneous increase, by 22 percentage points, in the share of services in GDP. In this same
period the share of manufacturing in GDP has risen almost 5 percentage points. How-
ever, these overall numbers disguise an apparent sharper increase which occurs roughly
in the 1970s followed by a longer period where the share remains more constant, aside
12Reducing taris, reducing barriers to entry, increased privatisation and liberalising foreign investment.
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from a transitory peak in 1995. The impression one gets from the graph is that the share
of manufacturing is falling at the end of the period, although it seems too short and small
a decline to draw any strong conclusions. This pattern is consistent with the stylised fact
of Herrendorf et al. (2014) who describe an n-shaped pattern for manufacturing during
the process of structural transformation. Interestingly though they nd in their sample
of countries using multiple data sources that this period of peak manufacturing share
tends to start when log GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars reaches approxim-
ately 9. In the case of India we nd that this peak manufacturing share begins around
1979, with the maximum share occurring in 1995. India’s per capita GDP in 1979 was
895.34 international dollars and 1,553.35 in 1995, from Maddison (2010). These are 6.8
and 7.3 log points respectively, far below the threshold found in cross-sectional data by
Herrendorf et al. (2014).13 However, consistent with their ndings of a threshold we see
that there is an acceleration in the growth in the service share around the time of the
peak share in 1995. This stylised fact is also documented in Buera and Kaboski (2012b),
who argue that this acceleration in the share of services at higher incomes appears to be
a common feature of structural transformation, and that it is driven by growth in skill-
intensive services. Whether this acceleration in India is also due to that is beyond the
scope of this chapter14. Again however, this apparent threshold is well above what we
observe here. The level of manufacturing share is also much lower than is typical for its
peak (mean 40% in Buera and Kaboski (2012b) panel). Whether this is an indication that
India is experiencing this transition to a primarily service based economy earlier than
13The graphs in Figure 2.2 are replicated, as in Herrendorf et al. (2014), with log GDP per capita in 1990
international dollars from Maddison (2010) on the x-axis, in Appendix Figure B.1. These show the
same qualitative and quantitative pattern as those graphs with year on the x-axis, as one would expect
when examining just one country. Although this exercise reduces the sample to end in 2008 due to
the Maddison (2010) data.
14For a discussion of the role of education in the Indian growth experience see Bosworth et al. (2006) for
example.
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other countries have previously or this is a transitory acceleration in the growth of the
service share on the equilibrium path is worthy of further research.
Indian employment in agriculture data is only available since 1994 from the WDI,
which shows that in this time it has fallen from 60.5% of total employment to 47.1%
of total employment in 201215. Instead we use data from the decadal Census of India
starting in 1961 which contain counts of people cultivating their own land or working
as agricultural labourers. We sum these counts and report them as a percentage total
population. Figure 2.7 Panel 4 contains this data for India, interpolated log-linearly for
graphical purposes. For comparability with other levels of disaggregation we look at this
percentage for males only. From 1961 to 2011 the share of the male population employed
in agriculture falls from 39.6% to 27.4%. For males and females combined these gures
are 31.3% and 22.3% respectively. These numbers are naturally lower than those typic-
ally seen (including those from the WDI) because we are examining percentages with
total population as the denominator, rather than employed population. Unfortunately
it appears these data are simply not available in the length of time-series we need here.
Using the average16 employment to population ratio for those aged 15 or over from the
ILO ILOSTAT database for India17, 56.9%, to adjust our population shares for these dif-
ferent populations, we nd that this estimate of agricultural share of total employment
falls from 55.1% in 1961 to 39.4% in 2011. These numbers are much more in line with
other estimates of this agricultural sector share for India. They are still an underestimate
because the ILO employment ratio uses only those over 15 years old and our population
includes all ages. Obviously this method of estimation ignores changes in the employ-
ment to population ratio so we do not have much condence in the trend for these data.
15Similarly ILO estimates are available only from 1991, and show a fall from 62.7% to 44.3% in 2017.
16for all available years in our sample, 1994-2011
17WDI variable name: SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS
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Note: Palanpur: Household income per capita in constant 2009 Rupees. Uttar
Pradesh: SDP per capita in constant 2009 Rupees. India: GDP per capita in
constant 2009 Rupees. GDP data not available for Moradabad District.
Source: Palanpur: Author’s Calculations. India: World Bank (Various years).
Uttar Pradesh: Ozler et al. (1996) and Indian Central Statistical Organisation,
deated using Uttar Pradesh CPIAL. UP population data interpolated from
census years.
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It is just reassuring that estimates using this technique are reasonably close to existing
estimates, so we have condence in that our census data is showing us the true trend in
agricultural employment share.
The Indian development experience mirrors well the cross country evidence from
Buera and Kaboski (2012a) of an initially more rapidly expanding manufacturing sec-
tor. The data from Sivasubramoniam (2000) demonstrate that the ratio of manufacturing
to service share in current prices is approximately 0.06 in the early years of the 20th
century. This ratio rises to a peak of 0.47 in the mid-1980s, and falls to 0.43 by the end
of the sample in 2000. While data from Reserve Bank of India (2016-17) Handbook of
Economic Statistics, from 1959-2011, show the clear hump-shape documented by Buera
and Kaboski (2012a). Rising from 0.35 in 1959 to a peak of 0.46 in 1981, and subsequently
dropping to 0.3 in 2011. It is possible to infer this hump-shape from examining Figure
2.2.
2.4. Uar Pradesh
Now we aim to show that these stylised facts of structural transformation also hold for
the State of Uttar Pradesh, where data are available. The Net State Domestic Product
(SDP) Data used for Uttar Pradesh comes from Ozler et al. (1996) for 1960-1993 and the
post-1993 data is collected from the India Central Statistical Organisation. We use net
SDP because it allows us to extend the data back to 1960 for current prices. However,
when we use the Consumer Prices Index for Agricultural Labour for Uttar Pradesh to
convert the series to comparable 2009 constant rupees we can only start the series from
1969.
Firstly we examine a necessary condition for the process of structural transformation,
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growing income per capita. We use net State Domestic Product (SDP) measured in con-
stant 2009 rupees in Figure 2.3 Panel 2, which demonstrates a more than doubling of
real per capita incomes in Uttar Pradesh between 1969 and 2011. It is more dicult to
interpret because of the reduced time-series but it appears that there is an increase in
per capita SDP growth in the late 1970s .
Figure 2.4 Panel 3 uses data from Ozler et al. (1996) and the CSO on state level agricul-
tural yields to show that Uttar Pradesh has experienced large increases in agricultural
productivity in line with those across the whole of India. Cereal yields have increased
333% between 1966 and 2011. It appears that relative to India as a whole the increase in
agricultural productivity occurs later, in the mid-1970s rather then the late 1960s.
Also from Ozler et al. (1996) and the CSO are estimates of SDP for Uttar Pradesh by
sector. Using these we construct a series of estimated percentage of current price SDP
from Agriculture for 1960 to 2014. The agricultural sector share falls from 59% to 27%
over this time period, as displayed in Figure 2.5 Panel 2. This decline in the GDP share
of agriculture appears to begin in the rst half of the 1970s and remain roughly constant
until the decline seemingly abates around 2010.
Figure 2.7 Panel 3 demonstrates the relative size of the agricultural sector in Uttar
Pradesh when measured by employment share. Employment type data in Uttar Pradesh
comes from the ICRISAT (2015) data for Census of India years. Using these data, and
interpolating log-linearly between decadal census, we nd that agricultural employment
of males as a percentage of total male population in Uttar Pradesh has fallen from 53% in
1961 to 28% in 2011.18 Again, as with India, these numbers are an underestimate when
considering the employed population as the denominator. If we use the same India-
18These same data for overall agricultural employment as a percentage of total population are 35.3% in
1961 to 19.43% in 2011
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Note: Cereal Yields by year in Kilograms per hectare.
Source: Palanpur: Author’s Calculations, Moradabad District: ICRISAT (2015),
Uttar Pradesh: Ozler et al. (1996) and India Central Statistical Organisation,
India: World Bank (Various years)
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wide average employment to population ratio of over 15s in lieu of any reliable time-
series estimates at state level, the male agricultural employment share decreases from
66% in 1961 to 35% in 2011.19 Although these are still underestimates given we use the
employment to population ratio for those over 15, these estimates for the employment
share in Uttar Pradesh are higher than the agricultural share as measured by its share of
GDP - consistent with the stylised facts of structural transformation.
2.5. Moradabad District
In this subsection we try to show as many of these stylised facts for Moradabad district
as possible. Certain district level data is available from ICRISAT (2015). Unfortunately,
GDP and GDP shares by sector are not available at the district level. However, we can
show the reallocation of resources away from the agricultural sector in the district us-
ing employment shares. Employment type data in Moradabad District is available from
ICRISAT (2015) for Census of India years. Using this we nd that male agricultural em-
ployment as a percentage of total male population in Moradabad district has fallen to 25%
in 2011 from 75% in 1961, see Figure 2.7 Panel 2 for graphical evidence. If we include male
and female agricultural employment as a percentage of total population these numbers
are 16% and 42% respectively. Just as for India and Uttar Pradesh above, because we use
total population we underestimate the usual measure of the agricultural employment
share. There are no estimates of the employed to population ratio for Moradabad dis-
trict, so again we use the India level estimate as before. Thus, the estimated agricultural
employment shares at the district level become 94% in 1961 and 32% in 2011 for males,
and 74% in 1961 and 28% in 2011 overall. We make no claim for the accuracy of these es-
19Or 62% to 34% for the full population.
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timates, they are merely indicative of the transition of the Moradabad district economy
shifting from a state where agriculture is responsible for the vast majority of employ-
ment to one where it is signicantly less important. However, due to data restrictions
we cannot determine into which sectors these individuals move.
During this period the cereal yield in kilograms per hectare in Moradabad district has
increased from 712.5 in 1966 (the earliest year for which the data are available) to 2,656.3
in 2010. This increase in agricultural productivity is shown in Figure 2.4 Panel 2. Once
more this evidence is consistent with the argument of Bustos et al. (2016) who show that
increasing agricultural productivity is labour-saving and causes reallocation of labour
away from agriculture.
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Note: Palanpur: Percentage of income from cultivation by year (current prices),
India: Agriculture as a percentage of GDP (current prices),
Uttar Pradesh: Agriculture as a percentage of state GDP (current prices).
District level income not available.
Source: Palanpur: Author’s Calculations, India: Reserve Bank of India (2016-17),
Uttar Pradesh: Ozler et al. (1996) and India Central Statistical Organisation
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2.6. Palanpur
Now we narrow our focus even further to the level of a village, Palanpur, and explore
how many of these stylised facts of structural transformation for countries map onto the
experience of a village. The development of Palanpur is clear from Figure 2.3 Panel 1,
which shows the increasing trend in real household income per capita in constant 2009
rupees. Despite this 133% increase in real per capita incomes through the study period20,
these villagers are relatively poor. Although not directly comparable, their income level
in 2009 is below the India level per capita GDP of the early 1960s.
Contemporaneous to this increase in real incomes Figure 2.4 panel 1 shows the in-
creasing agricultural productivity in Palanpur over the survey period. Cereal yield in
kilograms per hectare increased from 559 in 1958 (low of 504 in 1963) to 2,958 in 2009.
In monetary terms agricultural productivity increased from 120 rupees per acre in 1958
to 445 in 2009, in constant 2009 rupees. Due to the nature of the data it is impossible
to determine exactly when this increasing trend in agricultural productivity began. All
we can say for certain is that it began some time between 1964 and 1975 since the yields
roughly tripled between these surveys. Figure 2.5 panel 1 shows that while agricultural
productivity has increased the percentage of income from cultivation in Palanpur has
decreased, from 56.1% in 1958 to 33.7% in 2009.
Employment data for Palanpur residents was collected in all surveys. Thus we use
this measure of economic activity to describe the experience of structural transforma-
tion within Palanpur. Figure 2.6 shows the percentage of males who are over 15 and
present in the village employed by sector within each survey.21 These panels use the
20Rs5,753 in 1958, Rs13,424 in 2009
21These percentages do not add up to 100 since these individuals may be engaged in study or unemployed.
However, unemployment is a nebulous term in this setting and is not consistently coded so we use the
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Palanpur Structural Transformation
Note: Palanpur Structural Transformation using Employment by Sector.
Included are all males 15 or over present in the village.
Source: Palanpur: Author’s Calculations.
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individual’s primary occupation, that is the one in which they spend most time. The g-
ure illustrates many of the stylised facts of structural transformation. The percentage of
individuals employed in agriculture is strongly decreasing from 88% to 26% over the full
study period. If instead we consider not just primary occupation but all employment
this decline is less stark but still substantial - from 89% in 1958 to 50% in 2015. Com-
paring these initial employment rates with the percentage of income from cultivation
in 1958 from Figure 2.5 it is evident that the labour allocation in agriculture is higher
than its income share, by approximately 32 percentage points. While this denition of
income from agriculture is narrow, even if we expand it to its fullest extent and include
everything not considered part of the non-farm sector, as in Table 1.1, then the income
share from agriculture (almost 87%) is still lower than the employment share. It also
must be noted that this measure of agricultural income share contains many occupa-
tions which we consider to be services in our employment shares, for example tractor
rental. As such, we consider these gures as consistent with the cross-country stylised
fact that the agricultural income share is considerably lower than the agricultural em-
ployment share. That is, the village labour resources are engaged in the least productive
sector.
Figure 2.6 also illustrates two other features of structural transformation, a rising share
of employment in both services and manufacturing. The share of services in employment
rises more consistently than that of manufacturing throughout the study period. The
share of services in employment is also bounded away from zero even at the beginning
of the period when Palanpur is poorest. In fact, if one considers not just primary occu-
pation the share of working age males who are employed in services rises to 11% - rather
than 6.4% for primary occupation. Once again this is consistent with the cross-country
whole working age population as the denominator.
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stylised facts who nd a lower bound of around 10% for the service sector employment
share.
The share of employment in manufacturing expands more quickly than does the share
of employment in services initially. The ratio of employment in these sectors increases
from 0.06 in 1964 (0.18 in 1958) to a peak of 0.79 in 1984. These ratios and their pat-
tern are eerily similar to the averages from a panel of 31 countries found in Buera and
Kaboski (2012a). In their work, they describe the ratio of manufacturing to services
using value-added shares in current prices rather than the employment shares we use
here. They see initial average ratios of approximately 0.1 rising to a peak of 0.75 and
subsequently falling to 0.4. Our respective gures for the ratios in Palanpur are 0.06,
0.79 and 0.44. However, the income per capita at which they occur is much lower. These
ratios are obviously subject to a degree of noise given a relatively small sample size in
Palanpur, but we believe this similarity is worthy of further investigation in other areas.
The other stylised fact for the manufacturing share in the cross-country data is the
existence of a hump-shape through development. There is minimal evidence of a strong
consistent decline in the manufacturing share of employment in the Palanpur data. How-
ever, this is also true of India over the same period. The pattern in Palanpur suggests
more a strong increase followed by a more constant share - although there is a reas-
onable degree of noise. As noted previously, the typical threshold for this decrease in
manufacturing share to be observed in the cross-country data is roughly 8000 in 1990
international dollars, and Palanpur income is well below this level so we do not expect
to see a falling manufacturing share.
Returning now to the share of employment in the agricultural sector, we construct
a measure of employment in agriculture which is directly comparable with those g-
ures we have calculated from the India Census data for other areas. The percentage
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of Palanpur members present who are employed in agriculture in some form (either as
a cultivator or as an agricultural worker) has fallen from 30.8% to 19.0% from 1958 to
2015. Those who are employed in agriculture as their primary occupation has fallen
from 30.5% to 10.6%. These numbers are much lower than may be expected in this con-
text. We think it is highly likely that employment rates for women are underestimated
in the Palanpur data. Especially in agriculture, where anecdotally many women help
rear livestock and collect milk amongst other domestic work. As a result of this appar-
ent under-reporting we focus on the employment patterns of males. For males only we
nd that the equivalent rates are from 57.3% in 1958 to 34.5% in 2015 for males who are
employed in agriculture, and 56.6% in 1958 to 17.3% in 2015 for males who are employed
in agriculture as their primary occupation, shown in 2.7. These gures are much more
in line with the district and state gures.
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Note: Palanpur: Percentage of males employed primarily in agriculture.
India, Uttar Pradesh and Moradabad District: Percentage of male population
employed in agriculture. Data for India, UP and Moradabad are interpolated
log-linearly from census data in 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011.
Source: Palanpur: Author’s Calculations.
India, Uttar Pradesh and Moradabad District: ICRISAT (2015)
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2.7. Comparison between Palanpur, Moradabad
District, UP and India
Despite India having a population of 1.2 billion in 201122, Uttar Pradesh a state of 200
million in 201123, Moradabad a district of 4.7 million in 201124 and Palanpur being a
village of 1,299 people in 2009, and being vastly dierent entities, their development ex-
perience has been remarkably similar over the last 60 years. The three for which the
data are available have experienced annualised growth in income per capita between
1.5% and 3% over the full period of data availability - between 40 and 51 years.25 Along
this development path we see almost identical growth in agricultural productivity for
each entity, beginning the period with cereal yields around 500 kg per hectare and end-
ing at approximately 3,000 kg per hectare. The rates and timing of growth also appear
similar across each entity. The one exception is perhaps a slowing of the growth rate of
district level productivity from the mid-1990s onwards. We consider these two elements
- income per capita and agricultural productivity growth - to be necessary for structural
transformation.
Data are available on the agricultural employment share for each level of observation,
Figure 2.7. The trend in each of the series is decreasing. Focusing on just the share of
agriculture in male employment we see, unsurprisingly, that India has the lowest initial
level - 40% - since it has the highest level of income per capita throughout. The largest
percentage point decrease, 50 percentage points, occurred at the district level. How-
ever, Palanpur experienced the largest percentage decrease of 69% - the others declined
221,210,854,977 in Government of India (2011)
23199,812,341 in Government of India (2011)
244,772,006 in Government of India (2011)
25Palanpur: 1958-2009 - 1.74%. UP: 1969-2009 - 2.37%. India: 1960-2009 - 2.88%.
71
2. The Fractal Nature of Structural Transformation
between 31 and 67 percent. Interestingly it appears that the decline in agricultural em-
ployment share was particularly rapid in Uttar Pradesh during the 1960s, and that this
rapid decrease happened contemporaneously in Moradabad district and Palanpur. This
drop to between 35 and 40 percent is followed in each case by a much more gradual
downward trend in agricultural share in employment. The reason for this sharp de-
crease may be the Green Revolution which began in India in the mid-1960s with the
introduction of new high-yielding varieties of wheat. This sharp trend break in 1971 is
less apparent in the India data, and appears to occur in the 1980s. Perhaps this can be
explained by other Indian states being slower to adopted these new, more productive,
varieties of wheat and thus experiencing labour-saving technology related declines in
agricultural employment more recently. There is certainly a large degree of variation in
the increase in yields, and variation in when this increase began, by state. Foster and
Rosenzweig (1996) show for 12 states ratios of yields per acre between 1961 and 1981
which vary from 1.1 to 2.8. Graphically the variation in timing of the increases is evid-
ent. Uttar Pradesh seems to be a relatively early adopter, among these 12 states, and is
around the median productivity growth over the period.
Those geographic entities for which the data on the share of income from agriculture
exist - Palanpur, Uttar Pradesh and India - all experienced between a 22 and 32 percentage
point decline in the income share of the agricultural sector26, Figure 2.5. In percentage
terms this fall is largest for India since it starts from a lower base. What is noticeable
is the similarity in trend for each of the series, initially a slow downward trend which
increases quite sharply in the early to mid-1970s, followed by a attening of the trend in
the mid-2000s. This decrease occurs after the decrease in agricultural employment share
through the 1960s and seemingly coincident with the increase in agricultural productiv-
26Palanpur: 22, Uttar Pradesh: 32, India 26 percentage points
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ity. One limitation of the data used in this chapter is that the sectoral employment data
is decadal, so it is impossible to be more specic about when this sharp decline in the
agricultural employment share began.
Another feature of the data is that, despite our measure of the share of employment in
agriculture being an underestimate of the more common measures, initially for Palanpur
the share of employment in agriculture is higher than the share of income from agricul-
ture. This is one of the stylised facts shown by Herrendorf et al. (2014) for low levels
of development. The employment share levels for Uttar Pradesh and India are only 5
percentage points below the level of income shares at the beginning of the period. Addi-
tionally, when we use our estimate of the labour force participation rate to adjust these
estimates to the usual measures of employment share we nd estimates which are 7 and
11 percentage points higher than the income shares.
The ratio of manufacturing to services shares also behave similarly at all levels for
which we have the data. The cross-country literature displays a clear hump-shape pat-
tern for this ratio - the three values of this ratio which describe the beginning, peak and
end of this hump-shape are 0.1, 0.75 and 0.4 on average. When examining only India
this hump-shape is also clear, described by 0.06, 0.47 and 0.3 as beginning, peak and
end respectively. We do not have shares of income by sector in Palanpur, so we use
employment shares by sector. However, even when doing this we nd similar ratios of
manufacturing to services. The initial, peak and nal ratios are 0.18, 0.79 and 0.44 re-
spectively. For the manufacturing share of employment to rise initially faster than the
service share of employment within a rural village runs counter to the impression one
gets by reading the economic literature and popular press about rural India. There are
many discussions about rural non-farm employment. However, the perception seems to
be that this non-farm employment is typically in the service sector, and most commonly
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it takes the form of services which support the agricultural sector. Possibly this percep-
tion is driven by the fact that this service provision takes place within a village itself,
while work in the manufacturing sector typically takes place outside a village. Although
obviously as an income source it can play an important role in the village economy.
Thus far all the stylised facts of structural transformation have held up at every level of
disaggregation we have examined in this region of India. We believe this is an interesting
and as yet undocumented feature of structural transformation. This apparent fractal
nature of structural transformation means that we may be able to learn about macro
features of sectoral reallocation by studying micro level data. We investigate one of
these micro-level features of structural transformation, who are those transitioning out
of agriculture and into other sectors and why, in Chapter 3.
The similarities of the structural transformation experience across levels of India is
evidence in support of the complementarity of the agricultural and non-agricultural sec-
tors. All areas have experienced large increases in agricultural productivity but this does
not seem to have led to crowding out of non-agricultural activity, as found in Foster and
Rosenzweig (2004). The data seem more consistent with the labour-saving agricultural
productivity increases freeing up labour resources to change sectors as described in Bus-
tos et al. (2016).
2.8. Conclusion
A single village cannot possibly claim to be representative of a country of 1.2 billion
people, a state of 200 million people or even a district of 5 million people27. However,
the experience of Palanpur is remarkably similar to that of rural India, Uttar Pradesh
27Government of India (2011)
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and of Moradabad district as a whole. We nd, where data are available, that all levels
demonstrate declines in both agricultural income share and employment share, and that
for low levels of development the employment share is greater than the income share.
The share of manufacturing in output is initially strongly increasing, but this growth
slows so the share of manufacturing is roughly constant after this initial increase. The
decline in this share which denes the hump-shape in the classic cross-country stylised
facts is not strongly evident yet. This is likely because India, and the areas within it,
have not yet achieved the manufacturing share or level of per capita GDP which are
typically associated with the decline in manufacturing share28. However, there is some
indication that this decline may be happening earlier for India than is characteristic in
the cross-country evidence. This is supported by an acceleration in the growth rate of
the service sector which is coincident with a small decline in the manufacturing sector -
a feature which is evident in the cross country data of Buera and Kaboski (2012b). This
aspect of the Indian experience is worthy of further investigation29.
We also describe a striking commonality between a village economy and the cross-
sectional country-level evidence from Buera and Kaboski (2012a) - the ratio of the man-
ufacturing to service share displays a hump-shape of comparable size and magnitude.
To our knowledge this feature of a village economy has not previously been uncovered.
That the manufacturing sector within a village economy would grow faster initially than
the service sector is antithetical to the common perception. However, we can document
this for only one village and further work to establish if this is a widespread feature of
local economies is required.
An analysis of structural transformation writ small such as this is only possible due
28The mean of peak manufacturing share in Buera and Kaboski (2012a) is 40%.
29Although it may be complicated by the fact that India have recently changed their method of calculating
GDP and are yet to release comparable retrospective data.
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to the nature of the Palanpur data. Data for small geographic areas within developing
countries over the extremely long time periods needed to explore the process of develop-
ment are rare. There are a number of panel datasets which cover decades in developing
countries, for example the ARIS-REDS and ICRISAT in India, the KIDS in South Africa.
However, none of these span the length of the Palanpur data and these are typically
samples of households within areas. They cannot give an accurate representation of the
full local economy for all points in time due to attrition and household division. The
Palanpur data does not face these problems as it is a census of the village.
Palanpur is a village which is well-connected to other areas and larger urban conurba-
tions. Much of the manufacturing and service sector employment by Palanpur residents
actually takes place outside the village. We have no reason to believe that Palanpur is
unique in this regard. In fact, Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) use a model in which a
factory sector is external to the village economy when examining rural non-farm em-
ployment for their sample of villages. However, it is not clear how many of these features
of structural transformation would hold in a more closed village economy. Although it
seems reasonable to imagine that there would still be a sector of non-tradable services
to bound the service sector away from zero at the very least.
Related to this we nd that an increase in agricultural productivity combined with
good pre-existing transport links have led to a reallocation of labour out of agriculture,
consistent with the models of Gollin and Rogerson (2010); Gollin and Rogerson (2014).
However, we document a feature which is not captured by their models, that of commut-
ing - and thus lower rates of migration away from rural areas. Further work is needed
to examine the necessary conditions for this rural structural transformation to occur -
although the data requirements for examining this question would be extensive.
Our contribution is an explicit analysis of structural transformation for economies
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lower than the level of countries which to our knowledge has not been performed previ-
ously in the literature. This attempt indicates avenues for future research. One possible
avenue we wish to highlight would be the estimation of a model of structural transform-
ation using village level data. How closely matched the estimated structural parameters
from this exercise are to the evidence at the level of countries are would be extremely
interesting.
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Chapter 3
The Long Run Eects of Networks: Evidence from
Palanpur
The presence of social networks within labourmarkets is well-established. How-
ever, the vast majority of empirical estimates of labour market network eects
are contemporaneous or short run estimates. In contrast to this we examine the
long run eects and dynamics of labour market networks. We show, for two
dierent networks, short and long run eects on employment within a single
village in India, Palanpur. Familial ties have stronger network eects in the la-
bour market than do caste ties. The size of an agent’s cohort is initially negat-
ively associated with employment, but larger cohorts are benecial for network
members who arrive in the job market later. These networks have eects which
span decades. We show that these networks may lead to greater inequality
across networks through increased out-migration.
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3.1. Introduction
Humans are, by their very nature, social animals. We form partnerships and groups in
friendship, love, to achieve common goals, and have developed more than 7,000 lan-
guages1 with which to communicate within these groups. Some of these groupings are
large, e.g. nationalities, some of them are small, e.g. marriages. It is not surprising then
that economists have found these ubiquitous social networks to be important in a wide
variety of settings too numerous to list here. Within developing countries, where formal
institutions are less common or less eective, these traditional institutions of social net-
works may be even more important.
In this chapter we focus on two of these social networks, caste and family networks,
in a single village in India, Palanpur, for which we have rich data throughout a period of
substantial change in the nature of employment and of rising income levels over a span
of nearly 60 years. We explore the eects that these networks have on the distribution of
employment within the village, both in the short and long run. Two types of employment
are considered, one for which a priori we expect to see smaller network eects - known
as regular jobs. Consistent with this prior, employment opportunities outside the village
are more prone to job networks than these other regular jobs, and also that the networks
for families are stronger than those for castes. We then extend the estimation of these
short-run eects to examine the dynamics of these networks, exploiting information on
the entire village population at all points in time within our study period to examine the
eects of these networks in outside employment for cohorts within the village. We show
that the dynamics of these networks for outside workers are consistent with a dynamic
model from Beaman (2012) - there exists a competition eect within a cohort, and an
1Simons and Fennig (2018)
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information eect of job referrals. We show again that the network eects are stronger
for dynasty networks than caste networks.
In the nal part of the chapter we present evidence that these dynasty-level net-
works have long run implications. We show that these networks lead to increased out-
migration of individuals from the village. Given the evidence in the literature on the pos-
itive eects of migration on the migrant (for example Bryan et al. (2014) in Bangladesh
nd induced seasonal migrants experienced 30% increase in consumption), and on the
ineciently low migration rate in this setting (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)) these
networks are likely to lead to increased inequality across networks in the long run.
The caste network is a feature unique to India. Genetic evidence suggests that it is a so-
cietal feature which began up to 4000 years ago, but it still has a great deal of practical and
salient inuence in present day India. Caste networks have been shown to be important
for social insurance (Mazzocco and Saini (2012); Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)), busi-
ness activity (Munshi (2011)), schooling choices (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)), trade
(Anderson (2011)), and resource misallocation (Banerjee and Munshi (2004)); amongst
other things. Extended family networks are less widely studied in the economics lit-
erature, perhaps due to problems identifying them in typical household surveys. One
paper which does show the importance of familial networks in a developing country is
Angelucci et al. (2010), who show that a conditional cash transfer scheme only raises sec-
ondary school enrolment rates for those households which are part of an extended fam-
ily network.2 While Bandiera and Rasul (2006) show that technology adoption decisions
are more correlated within self-reported family and friends groups than religion-based
networks in Mozambique.
2Loury (2006) also discusses the eect of extended family members on educational outcomes for younger
members.
86
3. The Long Run Eects of Networks: Evidence from Palanpur
The existence of networks within labour markets is well established by direct evidence
from survey responses. Topa (2011) reviews the literature on labour market referrals,
mainly from developed countries, and describes reported referral rates from surveys of
job seekers - he concludes roughly half of all jobs are found through personal or informal
contacts. In developing countries the same networks are reported to be present. For
example Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) nd, for a sample of parents in Mumbai, that
the percentage of males who received help from a relative or caste member in nding
their rst job was 68 percent of working-class men, and 44 percent of men in white-collar
jobs.
As well as direct evidence from surveys the literature contains many studies which
try to estimate these networks eects explicitly. Bayer et al. (2008) uncover neighbour-
hood referral eects for individuals living in the same city block: a one standard devi-
ation increase in potential referrals raises hours worked per week by between 0.3 and 1.8
hours for men. Consistent with the survey evidence from Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)
above, they nd the estimated referral eects are stronger for less educated and younger
workers. Since residential locations are not randomly assigned they estimate these ef-
fects locally relative to nearby city blocks in a reference group. The critical assumption is
that people choose residential locations by choosing a location within a group of blocks,
and cannot choose a precise city block.
To avoid having to make these kinds of assumptions other authors have explored net-
work eects in labour markets using natural experiments. Laschever (2013) examines
how employment outcomes are aected by peers within a network of draftees into the
US army during World War I. He nds, for employment in the 1930 census, that each ad-
ditional employed network member increases a veteran’s own likelihood of employment
by 0.8 percentage point.
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There are a number of papers which estimate employment network eects using mi-
grant groups, usually to the US. Munshi (2003) studies Mexican migrants to the US,
using rainfall in a migrants origin community as an instrument for the size of the des-
tination network, he nds that migrants are more likely to be employed in a higher
paying non-agricultural job when their network is larger. This eect is driven by estab-
lished migrants3 within the network, and new migrants4 have an insignicantly positive
eect. However, this weakly positive response of employment is at odds with the the-
ory of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Beaman (2012), which argue that within
network competition could reduce employment.
Beaman (2012) examines this empirically with data from the International Rescue
Committee on refugees to the US arriving between 2001 and 2005. She nds that the
number of network members who arrive in the current and previous year decrease the
probability of employment after 90 days in the US for a new arrival, but that a larger
number of network members arriving 2 to 4 years previously increases the employment
probability of new arrivals. This is compelling evidence of the presence of competition
and information eects in job networks for migrants. However, it is not clear whether
migrants are representative of non-migrants in the degree to which they rely on net-
works for obtaining jobs. Our work speaks to this as we show network eects for a
non-migrant population in a setting which is very dierent to the one faced by migrants
to urban locations in the US. We also have the advantage of observing our network mem-
bers over their lifetimes. The limitation of our setting is that we do not have a natural
candidate for an instrument or natural experiment. We are limited to exploiting a variety
of xed eects to control for unobservables. Although one useful feature of our setting
3Community members located at the migrants destination for 4 or more years
4Community members at the destination for 1-3 years.
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is that, unlike choices over which city to move to or which neighbourhood to live in,
our networks of observation are exogenously dened by birth and immutable, given the
feature of endogamous marriage within castes.
Another strand of the literature related to this chapter is that which concerns intergen-
erational mobility and (nuclear) family networks, beginning with Becker and Tomes (1979).
Most similar to our work is that of Magruder (2010) who nds that fathers are a useful
network member for sons in South Africa. He estimates that growth within a father’s
industry of 10 percent is associated with a 3-4 percent increase in the son’s employment
probability when they are network members5. However, while this eect is intergener-
ational from father to son we still consider them as short run network eects since he is
exploiting heterogeneity within a 3 year panel.
A small number of papers focus on the potential long run impacts of networks. Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2006) show that the caste network may lead to a dynamic ineciency
within schooling choices in Mumbai. They argue that caste occupation norms and caste
referral networks led to lower-caste male network members missing out on the increas-
ing returns to English language schooling which accompanied service sector growth
in India during the 1990s. These schooling choices locked these males into traditional
caste occupations and could lead to intergenerational occupational persistence. In stark
contrast to this Munshi (2011) illustrates a setting where these same caste networks can
assist in avoiding occupational traps, the Indian diamond industry. He shows, consistent
with a dynamic model, that intergenerational occupational mobility is highest in those
networks with the worse outside options.
The nal part of this chapter is in the spirit of these papers on long run eects. We
5In his paper he exploits dierences between co-located father-son pairs and geographically separated
pairs.
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show that the familial job networks in our setting induce members to out-migrate from
the village. Given the large rural-urban wage dierentials within India67, and the poten-
tial income benets to households of even temporary migration (Morten (forthcoming)
nds that households increase their income by 30% in the years in which they send a
temporary migrant to the a city), these inducements to migrate could have economically
signicant impacts on the income of familial networks and the distribution of income
across these networks. Our evidence is also consistent with work by Akram et al. (2017)
who nd that a randomised experiment in Bangladesh which induces migration also
induces others connected to migrants to migrate as well.
The following section briey introduces some of the relevant details about Palanpur
which are important for this chapter (Section 3.2), for a fuller description of the village
see Chapter 1. Following that we describe the caste networks within Palanpur (Section
3.3) and their changing fortunes (Section 3.4), as well as the dynasty networks (Section
3.5) and the distribution of outside employment across these networks (Section 3.6). In
Section 3.7 we describe the size and construction of our competition networks. The es-
timates of the short run network eects are in Section 3.8. Estimation of the network
dynamics and evidence of migration eects are in Section 3.9 and Section 3.10 respect-
ively. Finally, Section 3.11 concludes.
6Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) show the urban wage is over 47 percent higher than the rural wage.
Chauvin et al. (2017) nd urban earnings are 122 percent higher than rural earnings in India
7Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018) nd signicant wage gaps between agricultural and non-agricultural
sectors in a panel of 13 countries, including India. They also show using panel data that those who
switch between agriculture and non-agriculture, even after accounting for human capital dierences,
in the United States, Brazil and Indonesia, earn higher wages.
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3.2. Palanpur
In this section we describe some of the features of Palanpur which are pertinent to our
study of networks. For a more detailed discussion of Palanpur see Section 1.2.
The evolution of Palanpur within the study period has been a declining importance of
agriculture, in terms of both employment and income. In place of this agricultural work
residents have moved into both services and manufacturing. Much of this employment
takes place outside the village but this “outside employment” as we term it is not neces-
sarily accompanied by migration. There is a train station in the village, which connects
directly to Delhi in around 6 hours. Although much closer are Chandausi 13km away,
a town of approximately 114,254; and Moradabad 31km away, the district capital with
a population of 889,810.8 Not every train stops at the station, but many do - enough to
allow villagers the possibility to commute daily to Chandausi or Moradabad.
These outside jobs are not homogeneous, both in terms of location and type. Some
are in manufacturing, some are services. However, these outside jobs are notably better
paying than agricultural labour. Even for the most dicult manual labour types of these
outside jobs - working in the Moradabad railway yard unloading trains - earn on average
Rs. 200 per day in 2009, compared to the prevailing agricultural wage of Rs. 100 per day.
This appears to be a fact which is not unique to Palanpur or more recent years. Himanshu
et al. (2013) report evidence from India National Sample Survey (NSS) data that the ratio
of mean casual non-farm to agricultural wages for 1983-2010 is between 1.3 and 1.5.
However, there is an important distinction to be drawn within these non-agricultural
jobs between what are commonly known as “regular” jobs and other types of jobs.9 Reg-
8Government of India (2011) - http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/data_les/India2/Table_2_PR_Cities_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf
9For further discussion of employment for Palanpur residents see Section 1.4.
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ular jobs are to a rst approximation jobs which involve monthly rather than daily wage
payments. These jobs are sought after since they oer numerous benets. “Employees
with such jobs usually enjoy a modicum of employment security, and, in most cases, sub-
stantially higher earnings than casual labourers.” Lanjouw and Stern (1998):p.128. From
the NSS data for the whole of India Himanshu et al. (2013) report that the ratio of mean
regular to casual non-farm wages for 1983-2010 is between 2.0 and 2.4. Many, though
not all of the regular jobs held by Palanpur residents in the study period are outside the
village, approximately 70%. These jobs are more formal than the other jobs held by Pa-
lanpur residents. Thus, we believe they are less likely to be subject to the eects of job
networks since they are more likely to have a formal hiring process. Although a formal
hiring process clearly does not rule out job referrals, as illustrated by the evidence from
the US.
The unique elements of the Palanpur data, aside from their longevity, are that the data
are collected as a census of the village, and it is possible to track how each household or
individual are related to each other, if at all. The data are taken as a series of snapshots
of the village over 60 years and there is no systematic attempt to create a timeline of
events which would enable the creation of a yearly panel from this data, since that was
not the purpose of the original studies.
However, due to the census nature of the data we know not only the individuals
present in the village who are enumerated in each survey. We also know about those
members of Palanpur who migrate out of the village, even if they are not present in
any survey. This is because households are asked about any members who are now not
present when they were in previous surveys, and also about any births in the household
in intervening years. Thus we know basic demographic information about everyone
who was at one time a member of the village, although we do not have income or em-
92
3. The Long Run Eects of Networks: Evidence from Palanpur
ployment data for those migrants who have left permanently. As a result the sample
of unique individuals who are present in at least one of the Palanpur surveys is 2,752,
but the number of unique individuals in what we refer to as the migration sample is
2,831. This feature of the surveys allows us to construct reliable networks for those in
the village at any point in their life.
Since we will be examining the networks of village members at dierent points in
their life it is important to address one concern about the Palanpur data, the reliability
of the age data for teenage females. “It is, we were told, quite common for people to
lie about the ages of girls in the range 11-15 or even to conceal their existence.” Bliss
and Stern (1982):p.15. However, when examining the density of ages of females in the
village we nd no evidence for this. There is no hole in the distribution of age of females
present in the village, which we would expect to see if females in the early teen range are
consistently being hidden from enumerators or if their ages are being manipulated. Also,
the distribution of female ages is very similar to the age distribution of males present
in the village10. An examination of the cumulative distribution functions of age by sex
further reassures that any dierences in the distributions come from females outlasting
males11. However, despite these reassurances we use only males in much of our analysis
due to the persistent nature of social norms in this environment where women do not
do work other than domestic work or caring for livestock, or other cultivation work.
There are two levels of social network which are salient for residents of Palanpur
in their everyday lives. These are the members of their caste, and the members of their
family. In the following sections we discuss the nature and experience of these networks
within Palanpur.
10A Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test gives a test statistic of 0.030, which means we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of equality at the 10% signicance level (p-value 0.107).
11The CDFs are shown in Appendix Figure C.1
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3.3. Caste in Palanpur
Genetic evidence suggests that the process of endogamous marriage, a fundamental fea-
ture of the caste system in India, dates from between 1,900 and 4,200 years ago (Moorjani
et al. (2013)). This feature of endogamy continues to persist, surveys suggest that almost
95 percent of Indian marriages continue to occur within jati (Munshi (2014)).12 As well
as endogamous marriages, there are other traditional features of castes - hierarchy, re-
strictions on inter-dining and inter-mingling.13 In the most extreme cases a minimum
physical distance is expected to be maintained between members of dierent jatis. Thus
jatis are not just extended networks of individuals linked by marriage or blood, but also
salient community networks in day-to-day interactions. In Indian villages it is typical for
houses belonging to members of the same caste to be located in clusters. Srinivas (1976)
describes how individuals in his study village would always ask a visitor about his jati
since they “regarded that bit of information as essential in order to learn about his occu-
pation, diet and life-style. How they behaved towards him also depended to some extent
on his jati” (page 164).
As a consequence of this history, and marriage practices, caste networks tend to be
12For a discussion about the relationship between caste, varna and jati see Srinivas (1962) and
Béteille (1996). In this thesis the terms caste and jati are used interchangeably.
13For a detailed account of how these features aect caste relations in a rural Indian village see
Srinivas (1976) chapter 6.
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larger than those typical in other countries based on clan (Luke and Munshi (2006) in
Kenya), relatives (Wang (2013) in China), or neighbourhood (Munshi (2003) in the United
States), since they span many villages and consist of thousands of individuals. In this
thesis however we focus only on the network of caste members who are resident in
Palanpur at some point since 1958.
There are members of 16 castes present in Palanpur in at least one survey; of these,
11 castes are represented in every survey. In the majority of Palanpur publications to
date 8 main (more populous) castes are considered: Thakur, Murao, Dhimar, Gadaria,
Passi, Jatab, Dhobi, Teli.14 The Dhobis and Telis are Muslims, however “The Muslims of
Palanpur also divide themselves into hereditary occupation groups that have many of the
basic contemporary features of Hindu castes, e.g. endogamy and hierarchy” (Lanjouw
and Stern (1998):p.26). They identify rst as Dhobis or Telis rather than as Muslims,
in much the same way as the Thakurs identify rst as Thakurs, not as Hindus. These
features of Muslim society in Palanpur mean that we treat Dhobis and Telis as castes
in the usual Hindu sense. Additional to these 8 main castes are 8 smaller castes which
range between 1 and 23 individuals in each survey: Nai, Kayasth, Balmiki15, Lohar, Khati,
Brahmin, Badhai, Carpenter16 - as well as 4 individuals whose caste is unknown. Table
3.1 shows the size of each caste in each survey, as well as the total number of individuals
of each caste in the village over the span of the surveys. It shows that the Muraos, a
traditional cultivating caste, have been the most populous caste throughout most of the
survey period. However, the Thakurs, ancestrally a ghting caste, are of a similar size
14More properly these castes are in fact jatis, or subcastes, but for convenience we refer to them as castes
throughout. These are the groups that villagers self-identify as when asked their caste, and are the
caste distinctions which are important for interactions among individuals and households within the
village.
15Known in previous Palanpur publications as either Bhangi or Harijan
16There is no record of the Hindi word for this caste in the original questionnaires.
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to the Muraos in all periods, and are actually largest in 1984. Thakurs belong to the
Kshatriya varna17, only they and the Brahmin household present in the 1993 survey are
from the “twice-born” castes. Other members of Palanpur are from the Sudra varna or
the “untouchable” castes. Thus the Thakurs are the “highest” caste in the caste hierarchy
within the village, excluding the Brahmin father and son in 1993. The lowest castes in the
hierarchy are those belonging to the scheduled castes - the Jatabs, Balmikis and Passis.
Although in Palanpur the Passis are endowed with better social status than either the
Jatabs or Balmikis18.
That there are no Brahmins in the village for the majority of the survey period is
not uncommon for villages of this size in Uttar Pradesh. As Bliss and Stern (1982) note:
“When the need is felt for a Brahmin to perform a religious ceremony he comes in from
a nearby village.” Anderson (2011) discusses the origins of village caste composition in
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and the phenomenon by which villages in this region come to
have no upper castes present. In their data they nd that 42 percent of villages contain
no upper caste individuals.
Given the importance of caste networks in Indian life it is not surprising that these
networks have been found to be the level at which networks are drawn to serve a variety
of functions. There are many papers which illustrate the importance of caste networks
in individual outcomes. Castes have been shown to be important for social insurance
(Mazzocco and Saini (2012); Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)), business activity (Mun-
shi (2011)), schooling choices (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)), trade (Anderson (2011)),
and resource misallocation (Banerjee and Munshi (2004)); amongst other things.
17The 4 ancient varna divisions of Hindu society in order of ritual status are Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya
and Sudra.
18“having come to this village from far o they do not seem to have imported with them their caste status
and enjoy a denitely better position than they had in their ancestral homeland”Ansari (1964)
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Table 3.1.: Caste Sizes by Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 UniquePresent
Unique
Total
Thakur 104 125 172 218 279 287 302 599 627
Murao 119 132 183 218 290 302 345 670 675
Dhimar 56 52 59 75 86 112 106 236 244
Gadaria 42 45 68 83 88 91 89 188 188
Dhobi 6 2 22 30 31 46 59 94 94
Teli 47 57 71 93 109 143 125 264 277
Passi 61 75 77 85 60 19 27 176 189
Jatab 71 71 97 119 133 198 201 384 393
Lohar 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Nai 10 7 9 4 6 8 11 24 24
Badhai 0 0 8 9 10 12 23 29 32
Kayasth 8 7 12 14 8 5 5 20 20
Khati 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 12 12
Carpenter 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 3
Balmiki 5 3 12 20 19 19 6 46 46
Brahmin 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 4
Total 535 583 793 968 1121 1246 1299 2752 2831
Note: Individuals present by caste for each survey year. Unique present is the
number of unique individuals who are present in the village in at least one
year. Unique Total is the number of unique individuals who are named as part
of a household in at least one year, even if absent.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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3.4. Paerns of Change for Castes
Unsurprisingly, given the importance of caste in these economic decisions, castes have
not evolved equally in Palanpur. This can be seen in Table 3.2, which shows mean real
per capita incomes for selected castes (those present in all survey rounds for which in-
come data were collected).19 Income data were not collected for the 1993 and 2015 survey
rounds. Incomes are collected at the household level and then divided by the number of
members present in the household, enabling them to be reported as per capita annual
incomes in 1960-61 rupees.20 These income numbers are designed to be comparable
across survey rounds and have been constructed using the same methodology.21 How-
ever, there are caveats associated with the use of reported income data from surveys
- especially when much of the income is from home production.22 There is also un-
avoidably a degree of noise which comes with surveying incomes only 5 times in 50
years, thus we avoid focusing on small or short trends, or inferring too much from ex-
act magnitudes. Obviously these incomes can only be observed for those individuals and
households which remain in the village, and must therefore be viewed with this in mind.
We consider migration decisions and patterns in Section 3.10.
Table 3.2 contains the real per capita income by year of each caste which is present in
all years of the survey. We see from Table 3.2 that some castes have become poorer on
average relative to the village as a whole over the 50 years examined, e.g. Dhobis and
Passis. While others have become relatively more prosperous on average, e.g. Kayasth.
19Incomes for all castes are included in Appendix Table C.1.
20The income from agricultural labour, non-agricultural labour, regular employment, self-employment,
jajmani, remittances, renting, farming, non-farm and livestock sources are all included. Nominal in-
comes are deated using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (GoI) for Uttar Pradesh.
21For details on this see Gaurav (2013) and Surendra (2013), which are part of the Palanpur data docu-
mentation.
22A discussion of these issues as they related to the Palanpur data is in Himanshu, Bakshi et al. (2011b)
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Table 3.2.: Mean Real Income Per Capita by Caste-Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 2009 Total
Thakur 203.4 245.9 326.5 266.3 474.3 333.6
Murao 280.2 252.7 332.8 330.8 456.1 353.7
Dhimar 121.3 97.71 221.6 210.7 343.0 223.7
Gadaria 195.5 228.4 278.2 220.7 502.8 308.4
Dhobi 249.1 802.0 157.3 196.0 162.4 187.8
Teli 112.2 114.3 237.8 228.6 538.8 308.9
Passi 191.8 260.5 263.8 228.3 315.5 242.9
Jatab 152.9 129.2 208.5 117.6 298.3 203.8
Kayasth 167.1 233.2 251.3 290.5 544.0 277.6
Village Average 190.9 204.5 278.2 241.9 421.2 291.4
Note: Includes only those castes which were present in all surveys
when income data were collected. Values are mean per capita
annual incomes of households, they are in 1960-61 Rupees. In-
come is not available for the surveys in 1993 and 2015. Totals
and Village Averages are weighted by individuals present. Vil-
lage Averages include all castes.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Interestingly for us, examining the two largest castes by population, the income of Thak-
urs has caught up to (and even overtaken in the most recent data) that of the Muraos.
Consistent with this Thakurs have higher consumption expenditure than Muraos in the
2009 survey.
Figure 3.1.: Regular Employment by Adult Males of Selected Castes
Note: All males 18 and over in migration sample included.
Source: Author’s Calculations
One possible explanation for the diering fortunes of castes is the relative dierence
in employment patterns. Focusing on the 3 most populous castes, Figure 3.1 shows the
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participation in regular employment by caste and year for adult males. It is apparent
that Thakurs have been much more likely, than Muraos or Jatabs, to be employed in
regular jobs in most of the surveys. Figure 3.2 displays the participation of these same
castes in all employment which is outside the village23. Again Thakurs are more likely
than Muraos to be working outside the village for the majority of the survey period, but
now Jatabs (a scheduled caste) are roughly as likely as Thakurs to be employed outside
Palanpur. The sample in these gures includes all male adults in the migration sample,
that is it includes even those who have left Palanpur as long as they are still alive. We
do this to avoid any trends being driven by selective migration of castes.
23This does not include those who migrate away from Palanpur permanently. Always when referring to
outside employment we mean employment outside the village for those who live in the village.
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Figure 3.2.: Outside Employment by Adult Males of Selected Castes
Note: All males 18 and over in migration sample included.
Source: Author’s Calculations
These gures combined suggest that there is a degree of specialisation of employment
by caste. Thakurs tend to work outside the village and are over represented in regular
employment, Jatabs are seemingly more likely to work outside the village in more casual
jobs, and Muraos are over-represented in work within the village. The traditional caste
occupation of the Murao is agriculture, it is possible this caste heritage makes them more
reluctant to venture into other types of employment. Another alternative explanation
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is that all castes are attracted by these higher paying jobs (which tend to be outside
the village) but individuals from some castes are able to make this transition because
of connections they have. Then once these network connections are established they
perpetuate a specialisation of employment type within these networks. Consistent with
this evidence is Mukhopadhyay (2011), who nds using only 1983, 1993 and 2008 Pa-
lanpur data that even conditional on land ownership Thakurs are more likely to work
outside than Muraos in 1993 and 2008 (he does not test if this is signicant for all years
combined).24
24Lanjouw and Stern (1998):p. 266 contains probits for 1975, 1984 and 1993 (again they do not combine
years). They nd that Murao, Thakur and Passi dummies are insignicant, but that Jatabs are signi-
cantly less likely to work outside during 1975 and 1984 - conditional on land ownership, education
and male household size.
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Figure 3.3.: Education by Adult Males of Selected Castes
Note: All males 18 and over present in the village included
Source: Author’s Calculations
One potential confounder to this explanation is education. Perhaps, in the example of
Muraos above, it is a lack of investment in education which means these regular jobs or
outside jobs are unattainable for this caste. Figure 3.3 suggests that this is not likely to be
the case here. It shows the proportion of the adult males in each of the 3 most populous
castes who have achieved what we refer to as the highest levels of education. That is they
are educated to class 9 or above. In absolute terms this is not a high level of education - it
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represents completion of at least 4 years of secondary school - however, only around one-
third of Palanpur males are educated to this standard and above. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the general increasing trend in education in Palanpur, and also that Thakurs are not
more likely than Muraos to be highly educated. In fact, Jatabs remain less likely than
the average villager to be highly educated, but this has not stopped them taking up job
opportunities outside the village.
This suggests to us that networks in employment may be important within Palanpur.
However, while caste networks have been shown to be important in an Indian context,
they are not the only potential network. In the next section we discuss another candidate,
that of an individual’s dynasty.
3.5. Dynasties in Palanpur
We dene a dynasty as all of those households which descend from the same root house-
hold which was enumerated in the 1958 survey.25 If households migrate into the village
and their relationship to existing households is known then these households are added
to the same dynasty. If in-migrating households have no ties to existing households,
or they are unknown, then the households begin their own unique dynasty. Thus, the
number of dynasties includes the 102 emanating from the original households in the
1958 survey, as well as 29 new dynasties formed by migrant households.
This denition of dynasty obviously ignores any relationships between the original
103 households, except for the two which merge in 1964. However, there is no simple
or clearly exogenous way of identifying the links between the remaining households.
Plus ignoring these links will bias our results towards zero if these links really matter in
25There is one exception to this, 2 households in the 1958 survey remerge in 1964, so are treated as one
dynasty.
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individuals networks. Therefore we have 131 dynasties in our data. Given the practice of
endogamous marriage within Palanpur and India more widely, these dynasties are also
a subset of an individual’s caste network.
Table 3.3 shows the number of households which are present by caste in each of the
survey years. 102 of the 103 original households present in 1958 are dynasties, but the
additional dynasties by caste are shown by the dierence between this number in the 1st
column of Table 3.3 and the last column, named Unique Dynasties. Thus we nd that the
most populous castes are also those which have the most dynasties, there are 25 Thakur
and 24 Murao dynasties respectively.
These dynasties range in size from 1 person households to dynasties of 103 unique
individuals. The biggest dynasty in any single year has 63 individuals present across
10 households. The mean dynasty is 21 unique individuals present in at least one sur-
vey, this mean has a standard deviation of 18.1. There is also considerable variation
in dynasties within surveys. The mean size of non-zero dynasty-years is 9.87 unique
individuals, with a standard deviation of 8.4.
Given the variation in dynasty size, there must also be variation in the degree of re-
latedness of individuals within a dynasty. Obviously a dynasty will, in most cases, in-
clude an individual’s parents, children, siblings, but it will often include nieces, nephews,
grandparents and even cousins or further relations. Familial ties are important in many
ways during an individual’s life, we can observe this simply by looking at our own or
our family’s experience. Additionally there are countless papers in almost every area of
science, medicine or social science which highlight a potential impact of familial ties.
We do not list them here, but see Munshi (2014) for an introduction to the economics of
these informal networks in the context of developing countries.
In the context of Palanpur dynasties are extremely important. Often many generations
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Table 3.3.: Households by Caste-Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 UniqueDynasties
Thakur 17 19 25 30 48 57 55 25
Murao 21 25 28 27 44 55 54 24
Dhimar 10 9 8 13 15 22 19 11
Gadaria 9 9 10 12 14 15 15 9
Dhobi 2 1 3 4 4 8 8 5
Teli 8 9 12 16 20 21 17 11
Passi 13 17 11 15 16 6 5 14
Jatab 16 13 14 19 24 39 33 18
Lohar 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nai 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Badhai 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 1
Kayasth 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
Khati 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Carpenter 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Balmiki 2 1 2 3 3 5 3 4
Brahmin 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 103 106 117 143 193 233 213 131
Note: Households present by caste for each survey year. Unique dynasties
is the number of unique root households who are present in the village
in at least one year.
Source: Author’s Calculations
107
3. The Long Run Eects of Networks: Evidence from Palanpur
of one family will live in one household and eat the same food. This sort of close inter-
action and reliance on each other can foster very close ties between individuals. Thus
given that we believe that there is some evidence of networks in Palanpur occupations
within caste, supported by previous evidence supplied by the literature (e.g. Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2006); Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)), it would seem imprudent not
to consider dynasties to be an important level at which networks may form. This is
consistent with anecdotal evidence from Palanpur. For example, “Caste-based networks
seem to inuence access to non-farm jobs. In many cases, access to job opportunities is
facilitated by network ties with family members, friends and neighbours. It is through
such networks that information about job opportunities is disseminated and that em-
ployment in non-farm activities is secured.” from Himanshu, Joshi et al. (2016).
3.6. Distribution of Outside Employment
Here we present some more evidence of networks in employment within Palanpur. We
look at the distribution of outside employment for males across castes and dynasties.
Table 3.4 Panel A clearly shows a high degree of clustering of outside employment
outcomes within both caste and dynasty-year pairs. We observe that 66% of dynasty-year
pairs (33% of caste-year pairs) have no outside workers in them. If jobs were allocated
randomly then each individual would have a probability of outside employment of just
over 14%. Given the average dynasty-year size of 5.24 males, we would expect to observe
47% of dynasty-year pairs to have zero outside workers. The probability of observing 66%
dynasty-year pairs of zero is essentially zero26. The story is similar for castes, given an
average caste-year size of 38.97 males we would expect to see no castes without outside
26Prob = 7.65e−19
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workers, whereas we observe a third of them don’t.
If jobs were allocated randomly with no regard to networks, then one would expect
the proportion of individuals in these jobs to be constant across all networks, and the
standard deviation would be zero. Although this is only true if the jobs are assigned
randomly across years. Given an increasing trend in outside employment evident in
the data this is clearly not the case. Thus we de-mean all network-year pairs relative
to the yearly mean observed for all networks. We test the equality of the proportions
between networks using this adjusted series, weighted by network members. We reject
the hypothesis of equal proportions of outside workers within dynasties at any level of
signicance27. We conduct the same test for castes and reject the null of equality at a
0.22% signicance level.
Clearly outside workers are not randomly assigned to between castes or dynasties.
However, this doesn’t guarantee that this observed pattern is the result of networks.
It may be, as mentioned earlier that the ability (for example education) distribution is
skewed towards some networks. We showed some evidence that this is not true for the
example of education in section 3.4 for some castes, but we will return to a discussion
of this issue later.
Also in Table 3.4, in Panel B, is the distribution of migrants across castes and dyn-
asties. Once again the pattern is clearly one of non-random assignment. Both caste and
dynasty-year pairs with no migrants or all migrants are overrepresented in the data.
Using the same adjustment for the time trend in migration as we did for outside em-
ployment, we reject the equality of proportions of migrants in network-year pairs for
both caste and dynasty. The signicance levels at which we can reject are even smaller
than those for outside employment.
27Prob = 2.56e−13
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Table 3.4.: Distribution of Outcomes Within Networks
Panel A Outside Employment
Net-Year





Caste 87 0.12 0.13 33.3 0 0 0.50 21.8 0
Dynasty 653 0.12 0.21 65.8 1.99 0 1 17.0 0
Panel B Migration
Net-Year





Caste 108 0.23 0.31 31.5 9.26 0 1 14.8 0
Dynasty 834 0.21 0.35 63.3 12.6 0 1 17.0 0
Note: All Males present in village included in Panel A. All males in migration sample
included in Panel B. Net-Year Pairs: Number of network-year pairs. None %: is
the percentage of network-year pairs for which none of the males are engaged in
the activity in question All %: is equivalently dened for network-pairs where all
males are engaged in the activity in question.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Short-run Job Network Eects
3.7. Network Sizes
In the previous sections we have shown the potential importance of caste and dynasty
networks in the labour market in Palanpur. Briey in this section we describe in more
detail the sizes of these networks and the construction of individual level network vari-
ables.
Firstly it is important to describe the samples used to for the analysis that follows.
There are two primary samples used, one which we refer to as the “present sample”, and
one referred to as the “migration sample”. The present sample contains for each survey
year, as the name suggests, all those individuals who are present in Palanpur at the time
of the survey. They may work outside the village or migrate away for short periods for
work, but they primarily reside in the village. The migration sample includes all those
in the present sample, plus those who are not present in the village but at some point
in time were members of a household in Palanpur28. All individuals alive in a year are
included in the sample for that year. If it is unknown whether an individual who has left
the village is alive or dead we treat them as alive until they reach an age of over 65, as
this is the rural life expectancy in India for 2006-201029. The present sample consists of
28These individuals need not be present in the village during any survey to be recorded in our data. During
each survey households are asked about any members who have left the village between surveys, and
some basic demographic details about these individuals.
29http://censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_Based/Introduction.pdf
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2,752 distinct individuals, but the migration sample comprises 2,831 distinct individuals.
Basic network (both caste and dynasty) variables are created simply by counting the
numbers of individuals in each sample during each survey, overall and by sex. We also
generate network variables which are the counts of an individual’s network members
engaged in particular types of job in a given year. For example, an individual may have 3
members of his caste working outside the village in 1975. For these variables we exclude
the individual whose network is being considered. Therefore the variable represents the
potential contacts in that employment type for the individual.
One quirk of the Palanpur data is that it is a series of snapshots of a village which are
often a long time apart. This means that in each subsequent survey we observe people at
very dierent times in their lives. In contrast to many panel surveys which are annual.
Due to this, and the census nature of the data, we can reconstruct the demographics of
the village to any point since 1958. We use this to construct truly individual network
variables which can represent the size of an individual’s network at any time in their
life. Most commonly we use the size of an individual’s network on their rst appearance
as an adult (> 18) in what follows.
3.7.1. Caste Networks
In Table 3.5 we present summary statistics for some of our caste network variables. We
focus only on males because they are the primary participants in the labour market
within a household. This table shows us that these caste networks are fairly large re-
lative to the size of the village. The mean caste network size is nearly 9% of the total
number of distinct individuals. This is driven by a number of very large castes, and
there is substantial variation in the size of caste networks. The size of caste networks
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Table 3.5.: Caste Network Sizes for Males
Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs
Caste Network 243.2 200 157.4 1 526 4391
Caste Network
of Males 104.7 84 65.2 1 227 4391
Caste Network
at 18 191.0 147 143.0 0 525 3458
Caste Outside Employ-
ment Network 15.1 9 15.8 0 50 4391
Caste Regular Employ-
ment Network 7.54 5 9.00 0 35 4391
Caste Non-Farm
Self-Emp Network 5.80 3 6.17 0 21 4391
Caste Highly
Educated Network 30.4 19 29.7 0 90 4391
Note: All males in migration sample included calculations. Caste Net-
work and Network of Males variables include all individuals in net-
work. Those variables which are occupation-specic do not include
the member whose network is being considered, and thus are the
potential contacts for the member in question.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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at 18 is smaller because of population growth at the village level, and there are fewer
observations since we do not create this variable for individuals who do not reach 18 in
the survey period. Since our focus is the labour market and males are the primary parti-
cipants in the labour market in our context it is important to note the average male has a
network of approximately 100 males within his caste. Not all of these males live within
the village so this is a large and potentially widely dispersed network of contacts. There
are an average of 15 outside workers, 8 in regular employment and 6 self-employed in
non-farm occupations. These averages disguise substantial variation in the typical occu-
pations within these networks, there are networks with much greater or lesser contact
with these jobs types.
3.7.2. Dynasty Networks
The dynasty networks summarised in Table 3.6 are generated in the same way as the
caste network variables. These networks also show substantial variation in size, and
in employment of dierent types. These dynasty networks are much smaller than the
caste networks, approximately 10% of the size. Thus now, the network of labour market
contacts within a dynasty is on average 8.8530. This is a considerably smaller network
than one’s caste network but the kinship ties between them are much closer on average.
It is apparent when comparing the caste and dynasty networks that employment types
are more dispersed in dynasties than castes. The coecient of variation of these employ-
ment networks for dynasties vary between 1.44 and 1.96, while for caste employment
networks these range between 1.05 and 1.19. This larger specialisation in dynasties than
castes is also present for education, coecient of variation of 1.42 versus 0.98.
30subtracting the individual whose network we are considering
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Table 3.6.: Dynasty Network Sizes for Males
Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs
Dynasty Network 22.0 17 17.2 1 85 4391
Dynasty Network
of Males 9.85 8 7.43 1 36 4391
Dynasty Network
at 18 16.4 12 15.1 0 82 3458
Dynasty Outside Employ-
ment Network 1.42 0 2.05 0 9 4391
Dynasty Regular Employ-
ment Network 0.73 0 1.43 0 9 4391
Dynasty Non-Farm
Self-Emp Network 0.60 0 1.12 0 6 4391
Dynasty Highly
Educated Network 2.88 1 4.08 0 21 4391
Note: All males in migration sample included calculations. Dynasty Net-
work and Network of Males variables include all individuals in net-
work. Those variables which are occupation-specic do not include
the member whose network is being considered, and thus are the po-
tential contacts for the member in question.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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3.7.3. Competitive Networks
We are not only interested in the size of individuals networks. Another factor we think
will be relevant to the eect of networks on job attainment is the degree of competition
for a job which is faced by an individual within his network. We believe this is captured
well by a count of the number of network members an individual has within a small
number of years of them. That is, an extra network member who is a year older than
you is much more of a direct competitor for any potential jobs which become available
than one who is 10 years older or younger than you. We describe the nature of this
competition within both caste and dynasty networks in Table 3.7, panels A and B. These
display the mean and median age dierence between the individual whose network is
being measured and the closest member of the same sex in their network. As expected
caste, as the larger of the two network sizes, is more densely populated and therefore
has lower average dierences between closest network members.
Also in both panels of Table 3.7 are counts of the number of male members within
4 years (inclusive) of an individual within their network. It is these network members,
males within 4 years, who we consider to be the competitive network of an individual31.
As can be seen, the number of competitors in both networks is increasing over time due
to population growth, and this is mirrored by the falling mean and median age dier-
ences within networks. The median male in our sample has one competitor within his
dynasty, but 13 within his caste. However, a priori these competitors may be a hindrance
or a benet to an individual. They may take a job referral which may otherwise have
been passed to the individual in question, or they may be the source of a job referral to
31Appendix Table C.2 contains an extended set of descriptives for caste networks, including descriptives
for dierent denitions of a competition network. Appendix Table C.3 contains these same descriptives
for dynasty level competition variables.
116
3. The Long Run Eects of Networks: Evidence from Palanpur
Table 3.7.: Competitive Network Descriptives - Males
Panel A Caste
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 All
Mean age
dierence 1.47 1.30 0.93 0.74 0.65 0.48 0.45 0.73
Median age
dierence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean % with compet-
itor within 4 years 89.6 91.0 92.5 96.0 96.6 97.5 97.7 95.4
Mean: count compet-
itors within 4 years 7.42 8.09 11.9 14.0 18.4 20.3 22.3 16.6
Median: count compet-
itors within 4 years 6 7 10 12 14 17 21 13
Panel B Dynasty
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 All
Mean age
dierence 12.8 12.8 9.37 7.21 5.66 4.36 3.90 6.73
Median age
dierence 7 7 5 4 3 2 2 3
Mean % with compet-
itor within 4 years 33.4 36.0 46.9 57.4 64.4 72.2 74.7 60.4
Mean: count compet-
itors within 4 years 0.46 0.55 0.87 1.07 1.53 1.81 2.07 1.40
Median: count compet-
itors within 4 years 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1
Note: All Males in migration sample included. The Mean and Median age dif-
ference refer to the age dierence between an individual and the closest male
member in their network in the migration sample. Panel A contains competit-
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the individual. Which of these eects dominates is an empirical question.




In this section we present graphical evidence for these network eects in the form of an
event study. The event we use here is that at least one member of an individual’s net-
work is in outside work in the current survey when none were in the previous survey32.
Our event study examines the eect of this event on the proportion of an individual’s
network who are in outside employment, after removing the members of the network
who received these initial outside jobs. For the graphical evidence we restrict the sample
to include only the rst occurrence of an outside worker within the network of interest.
That is, the event captured by the graph is the rst appearance of an outside worker
within an individual’s network33.
Figure 3.4 displays this event study for caste networks. We see that while the appear-
ance of an outside worker within one’s caste network increases the likelihood that other
caste members are employed outside the village in subsequent surveys, there is not a
sharp jump in the probability initially after the event. However, in Figure 3.5, which
shows the same event study for dynasty networks, there is a large jump in the prob-
ability of outside employment in the rst survey after a dynasty member gains outside
employment. This large increased proportion of the network which is employed outside
32ynt > 1 ∩ yn(t−1) = 0. Where ynt is outside employment within network n in survey t.
33ynt > 1 ∩ yn(t−j) = 0 ∀j > 0
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Surveys to Event
Event = At least one member of individual's network is in outside work
when none were in the previous survey
Note: Includes all males in migration sample. Figure includes only the rst ap-
pearance of an outside worker within an individual’s caste network. The event
occurs at 0 on the x-axis.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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the village is sustained over all remaining surveys. We think this is interesting and com-
pelling evidence for the existence of network eects in outside employment. Due to the
periodic nature of the Palanpur data these are not simply the same individuals remain-
ing in outside employment. The surveys are 6 to 16 years apart, the nature of a dynasty
network can be markedly dierent in this time span - children are born, households
sub-divide, members migrate or die.
After the graphical evidence we now turn to some simple regression specications to
explore these network eects in outside employment further. Table 3.8 contains a version
of this event study for caste networks. Our data permit us to include caste, dynasty and
individual xed eects - however since these are subsets of one another we can only
include one at a time - and also year xed eects, which can also be thought of as survey
xed eects, are included in all specications. Once again we include only males in our
sample due to the lack of a female labour market outside the village. We include only
males who are 14 or older in any survey since those who never appear in our data as
older than this will almost certainly not obtain employment outside the village at such
a young age. For this section we only include the sample of individuals who are living
in the village, since we consider those resident in the village to be more indicative of
the network of competitors which an individual faces in trying to obtain one of these
jobs. We will discuss migration further when we examine the long run eects of these
networks later in section 3.9.
In the regression version of this event study we include all occurrences of outside
workers within an individual’s network. The event variable is dened as equal to one if
there are any outside workers (not including the individual’s own employment) within
an individual’s network, and zero otherwise. The regressions are of the form:
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Event = At least one member of individual's network is in outside work
when none were in the previous survey
Note: Includes all males in migration sample. Figure includes only the rst ap-
pearance of an outside worker within an individual’s dynasty network. The
event occurs at 0 on the x-axis.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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yidct = α+ βEidct + γ(Eidct × Cidct) + δt + φ(i)(d)(c) + idct (3.1)
Where Eidct is the event variable for an individual, i, of caste c, and dynasty d, in sur-
vey t. yidct is a dummy variable for the employment status of individual i. yidct = 1
if individual is employed outside the village in survey t, and zero otherwise. Thus β
captures the job network eect - if it is positive (as we would expect) then the pres-
ence of outside workers within an individual’s network is associated with an increased
likelihood of the individual being employed outside the village.
The regressions include survey xed eects, δt, and one of individual, dynasty or caste
xed eects, φ(i)(d)(c). They also include an interaction between the event variable and
Cidct, a variable designed to capture the degree of within-network competition that an
individual faces. Here we dene a competitor as another male member of the network
who is aged within 4 years of the individual under consideration. Then the degree of
competition faced by an individual, Cidct, is the count of such members within their
network. If the job networks within Palanpur behave as is typical of the theoretical
literature (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004)) then job information is passed through
employed individuals to their contacts. Thus if an employed individual has more contacts
then each of those contacts is less likely to receive the job referral. As a consequence
we expect the job network eect to be mitigated by this form of competition. In our
empirical specication, Equation 3.1, this mitigation is captured by γ which we expect
to be negative - and the total job network eect of an outside worker in an individual’s
network is given by (β+ γCidct).
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Table 3.8.: Outside Employment Caste Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Event 0.0468** 0.0239 0.0107 0.00465 0.00922 0.0226(0.0223) (0.0292) (0.0309) (0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0295)
Competition
Interaction
−0.00218** −0.00486** 0.0000792 0.000524 −0.00557*** −0.00564***
(0.000930) (0.00221) (0.00104) (0.00103) (0.00184) (0.00205)
Caste Network −0.0000767 −0.000218 −0.00105*** −0.00155**(0.000381) (0.000401) (0.000384) (0.000763)

















Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE No No Yes No No No
Dynasty FE No No No Yes No No
Individual FE No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2949 2826 2949 2949 2826 2826
Castes 13 12 13 13 12 12
Dynasties 116 110 116 116 110 110
Individuals 923 800 923 923 800 800
Mean Dep Var 0.163 0.167 0.163 0.163 0.167 0.167
R2 0.145 0.488 0.169 0.229 0.501 0.492
P-Value of Comp
Interaction 0.021 0.030 0.939 0.613 0.003 0.007
Note: Event: There is at least one individual in outside employment in individuals caste. Competition Interaction:
Event variable interacted with count of caste members in an individual’s competitive network (within 4 years of
age) Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside employment. Only males who are over 14 years
of age in at least one survey are included. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level.
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Table 3.8 shows that the presence of an outside worker in an individual’s caste is as-
sociated with a 0.47− 4.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of that individual
working outside in that survey, although only one of these coecients is signicantly
dierent from zero. Given a mean of outside work of 16.7% in this sample, that is a 13.5%
increase in the probability of working outside in our preferred specication, column (6).
We interpret this as the job network eect of castes. This job network eect in out-
side work is mitigated, as predicted, by the degree of competition faced by an individual
within their network. In the regressions in Table 3.8 the interaction between caste com-
petition and the event variable shows us that the presence of an extra competitor in your
caste network reduces this job network eect by 0.56 percentage points in our preferred
specication.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.8 present the simplest form of these regressions, with
only age controls, column (1) has only year xed eects, while column (2) contains in-
dividual xed eects also. Progressively we add controls and dierent levels of xed
eects. In columns (3)-(6) we control for both caste and dynasty size to help control for
dierential migration or demographic trends of these networks. Column (5) includes
controls for the number of outside workers within caste and dynasty. These are ob-
viously bad controls if, as we contend, job networks exist in outside employment since
they will be co-determined with the dependent variable. Their inclusion does not change
the point estimates of our event and competition interaction variables. It does however
reduce the signicance of the event variable because they are correlated with it by con-
struction. However, the event eect remains positive even with these controls for the
degree of interaction with outside jobs within an individual’s caste and dynasty. Addi-
tionally the presence of more network members working outside is positively associated
with individual outside employment for both networks, as one would expect in the pres-
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ence of network eects. Our preferred specication is that given in column (6) of Table
3.8, since this includes individual xed eects which remove any endogeneity from xed
characteristics of the individuals, such as ability. Column (6) also controls for the total
size of the caste and dynasty networks of an individual in case there is an interaction
between the referral behaviour of networks and their size. Additional controls for the
number of highly educated (completed class 9 or above) members of the individuals
caste and dynasty are also included - these are intended as proxies for the overall level
of ability within networks, and to control for any endogeneity coming from dierential
referral behaviour by more or less able networks. The inclusion of these variables leaves
the coecients of interest unchanged in magnitude and signicance.
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Table 3.9.: Outside Employment Dynasty Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Event 0.168*** 0.113*** 0.138*** 0.0693** 0.0605 0.120***(0.0273) (0.0314) (0.0273) (0.0319) (0.0366) (0.0318)
Competition
Interaction
−0.0219** −0.0255* −0.0158* −0.0171** −0.0265** −0.0250*
(0.00928) (0.0143) (0.00808) (0.00755) (0.0133) (0.0143)
Caste Network −0.0000540 −0.000154 −0.00103*** −0.00143**(0.000301) (0.000350) (0.000361) (0.000660)

















Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE No No Yes No No No
Dynasty FE No No No Yes No No
Individual FE No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2949 2826 2949 2949 2826 2826
Castes 13 12 13 13 12 12
Dynasties 116 110 116 116 110 110
Individuals 923 800 923 923 800 800
Mean Dep Var 0.163 0.167 0.163 0.163 0.167 0.167
R2 0.169 0.493 0.186 0.233 0.501 0.497
P-Value of Comp
Interaction 0.020 0.077 0.053 0.025 0.049 0.082
Note: Event: There is at least one individual in outside employment in individuals dynasty. Competition Interaction:
Event variable interacted with count of dynasty members in an individual’s competitive network (within 4 years of
age) Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside employment. Only males who are over 14 years
of age in at least one survey are included. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level.
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Table 3.9 contains the same regressions for outside employment network eects, but
this time using the dynasty as our network of analysis. It shows a much larger job net-
work eect. The presence of an outside worker in dynasty is associated with a 6.1−16.8
percentage point increase in the likelihood of an individual working outside the village.
In our preferred specication, column (6), this is a 71.86% increase in the probability of
working outside the village. Just as with caste networks this eect is mitigated by the
degree of competition faced by an individual. An extra competitor in an individual’s
dynasty network decreases this probability of outside employment by 2.5 percentage
points in column (6). These eect sizes are larger than those for caste networks. This
is unsurprising given that the connectedness of contacts in a dynasty network will be
closer than for a caste network.
3.8.2. Regular Employment
Turning our attention now to an event study using a dierent type of employment, reg-
ular employment. Introduced in Section 3.2, this denition of a job is common in rural
India but to a rst approximation it means that wages are paid monthly rather than daily.
These jobs are relatively highly remunerated, and are thus highly sought after. While
there are regular jobs in the village (e.g. railway workers) most, 71.3%, of all regular jobs
done by an adult Palanpur resident in any survey are outside the village. We believe that
these jobs are less likely to exhibit the features of employment networks due to certain
requirements for the position, or a selection process which happens at a higher level of
authority. However, due to the wide variety of jobs which are still included in this job
category it is likely that some of them may permit referrals.
Figure 3.6 contains our event study done in the same way as for outside employment
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Event = At least one member of individual's network is in regular job
when none were in the previous survey
Note: Includes males in migration sample. Figure includes only the rst
appearance of a regular worker within an individual’s caste network.
The event occurs at 0 on the x-axis.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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previously, this time done for regular employment within caste networks. Now the event
illustrated is the rst appearance of a regular employee within an individual’s network.
While there is an increase in the proportion of regular employees within a caste, after
the initial event of one member obtaining an outside job, this increase is not a sharp
increase in the initial survey after the event. It also appears from the gure that this
increase is not sustained.
In comparison, Figure 3.7 illustrates the event study for regular employment within
dynasties graphically. The increase in the proportion of regular employees within the
dynasty happens sharply with the rst appearance of at least one regular employee. It
also appears that, despite a dip, this increase is sustained within dynasties in subsequent
surveys. These gures taken together suggest that dynasty networks are more important
for regular employment labour markets than are castes.
Examining these short run job networks using the same regression specications
(Equation 3.1) as we did previously with outside employment opportunities. Except this
time with a dummy for employment in a regular job as the dependent variable. Table
3.10 shows the regressions for caste networks. The presence of a regular employee in
caste is negatively associated with an individual working in regular employment. This
indicates a lack of a job referral network for regular jobs in Palanpur, so we observe a
negative eect because these jobs are not plentiful so if a network member obtains one
of these jobs then that is one which you can now no longer obtain. Consistent with
this an extra competitor within ones network is associated with a lower probability of
regular employment.
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Event = At least one member of individual's network is in regular job
when none were in the previous survey
Note: Includes all males in migration sample. Figure includes only the rst
appearance of a regular worker within an individual’s dynasty network.
The event occurs at 0 on the x-axis.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 3.10.: Regular Employment Caste Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp
Event −0.0136 −0.0833* −0.125*** −0.128*** −0.0899** −0.0728*(0.0336) (0.0428) (0.0407) (0.0433) (0.0419) (0.0420)
Competition
Interaction
−0.000162 −0.00535*** −0.000553 −0.000455 −0.00534*** −0.00570***
(0.000658) (0.00177) (0.000849) (0.000943) (0.00146) (0.00173)
Caste Network 0.000717*** 0.000569** −0.000715** −0.000860**(0.000251) (0.000268) (0.000293) (0.000377)

















Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE No No Yes No No No
Dynasty FE No No No Yes No No
Individual FE No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2949 2826 2949 2949 2826 2826
Castes 13 12 13 13 12 12
Dynasties 116 110 116 116 110 110
Individuals 923 800 923 923 800 800
Mean Dep Var 0.091 0.093 0.091 0.091 0.093 0.093
R2 0.058 0.480 0.112 0.181 0.492 0.483
P-Value of Comp
Interaction 0.806 0.003 0.516 0.630 0.000 0.001
Note: Event: There is at least one individual in regular employment in individuals caste. Competition Interac-
tion: Event variable interacted with count of caste members in an individual’s competitive network (within
4 years of age) Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in regular employment. Only males who
are over 14 years of age in at least one survey are included. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level.
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The dynasty level job network eect regressions are in Table 3.11. In these regressions
the event of a dynasty member obtaining a regular job is associated with between a −1.5
to 11.6 percentage point increase in the probability of individual regular employment.
This is a large range of eect sizes and two are insignicantly dierent from zero at
the 10% level of signicance. In our preferred specication (column 6) the eect size is
5.5 percentage points and is marginally signicant. This apparent increase in the regular
employment probability does not seem to be related to the number of competitors within
an individual’s dynasty. The eect of an extra competitor is insignicantly dierent from
zero in all specications, although consistently slightly negative as we would expect.
The coecients on the competition interaction variable are at least an order of mag-
nitude smaller than those for outside employment, while the outside employment jobs
are only twice as numerous. So outside workers appear to be more networked than
regular employees. This is plausible, since a number of the regular jobs require formal
training, e.g. teachers, while others are selected at a higher level than the village, e.g.
Public Distribution Scheme worker. In comparison many of the outside jobs which are
not regular are more casual in nature.
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Table 3.11.: Regular Employment Dynasty Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp Regular Emp
Event 0.116*** 0.0595** 0.0686** −0.0154 0.00390 0.0548*(0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0292) (0.0304) (0.0324) (0.0289)
Competition
Interaction
−0.00990 −0.0153 −0.00885 −0.00926 −0.0121 −0.0177
(0.00776) (0.0111) (0.00808) (0.00817) (0.0107) (0.0114)
Caste Network 0.000671*** 0.000586** −0.000586* −0.000811**(0.000210) (0.000282) (0.000299) (0.000389)

















Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE No No Yes No No No
Dynasty FE No No No Yes No No
Individual FE No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2949 2826 2949 2949 2826 2826
Castes 13 12 13 13 12 12
Dynasties 116 110 116 116 110 110
Individuals 923 800 923 923 800 800
Mean Dep Var 0.091 0.093 0.091 0.091 0.093 0.093
R2 0.085 0.476 0.113 0.177 0.486 0.479
P-Value of Comp
Interaction 0.205 0.172 0.275 0.259 0.264 0.124
Note: Event: There is at least one individual in regular employment in individuals dynasty. Competition Interac-
tion: Event variable interacted with count of dynasty members in an individual’s competitive network (within
4 years of age) Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in regular employment. Only males who
are over 14 years of age in at least one survey are included. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level.
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The results in this section suggest that the relevant social division for labour market
networks in this context is families and not castes. The magnitudes of these short run job
network eects are larger for dynasties in both subsets of jobs we examine, and the eect
of competition from others is more pronounced at this level. While caste networks also
appear to have these short run job network eects, particularly for outside employment,
and are important determinants of outcomes in the labour market, if we ignore the role
of family ties and dynasties then we will be missing an important social network in this
context.
In order to try and identify the causal impact of the networks on job attainment this
section has relied on a series of xed eects. The survey design permits the inclusion
of individual xed eects, these remove any unobserved time-invariant characteristics
of individuals which may be correlated with the probability of attaining an outside job,
such as ability. The inclusion of year xed eects removes dierences in average probab-
ility of working outside the village for dierent surveys. However, there is still a threat
to identication if there are time-varying unobserved characteristics which determine
whether an individual works outside the village, and if these unobserved characteristics
are correlated with the event of a member of ones network being employed outside the
village when there were none previously.
This section has been largely focused on associations between individuals in Palanpur
in the same survey, and the correlations in their outcomes in the job market. While these
labour market network eects, and the level at which they operate, are interesting, the
primary advantage of the Palanpur data is the length of time over which we have data.
Thus we now turn our attention to the presence of long run eects of these networks of
caste and dynasty in labour market outcomes.
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3.9. Dynamics of Job Networks in Palanpur
From the previous section we know that a member of one’s dynasty becoming employed
outside the village between surveys is associated with a 70% increase in individual prob-
ability of outside employment. This is the short run eect of job networks. However, we
are also interested in the long-run eects of these job networks. To aid in this we use a
framework from Beaman (2012) to illustrate intuition and provide testable implications.
3.9.1. Theoretical Framework
The model from Beaman (2012) has an OLG framework where each agent lives and works
for S periods. An agents cohort, c, is dened as the period they enter the labour market,
in the context of Palanpur this cohort consists of the individuals who reach adulthood
(nish school) at or around the same time. Each cohort is of size Nc, all individuals
within a cohort are identical. We assume that all individuals within a network are con-
nected, the network being the dynasty or caste in this context. If an agent i in cohort c
is employed outside village at end of period t, stic = 1. stic = 0 if agent i is not employed
outside the village.
There is an exogenous breakup rate of b, which is the probability of losing a job at the
beginning of the period. An agent hears about a job with probability a, independent of
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other agents34. If the agent is not employed outside the village, they accept the job. If they
are already employed, they pass on to an unemployed network member. The constant
probability with which jobs arrive, a, means that the total number of jobs available
scales up as the size of the network increases. However, this assumption is reasonable
if the agent’s network is small with respect to the world. In the context of Palanpur
this seems entirely justied since we are considering an individual’s caste or dynasty
network in relation to the job market in larger villages or towns in the surrounding area.
The employment rate, stic, is the probability of outside employment for an individual, i,
in cohort c, in period t.
stc = a+ r
t if c = t (3.2)
Where rt is the probability of receiving job information through a network member.
Thus for individuals already in the market for at least one period, the probability of being
employed outside is:
stc = (1− b)s
t−1
c + (1− (1− b)s
t−1
c )(a+ r
t) if c 6 t 6 c+ (S− 1) (3.3)
Given a network size in a given period, Nk, the probability of receiving job informa-
















34Propositions 1 and 2 which we use are robust to allowing the job information arrival rate to be state
dependent, i.e. depend on employment status. See Beaman (2012)
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Where the numerator is the total number of jobs that are available in network to be
passed and the denominator is the number of potential recipients. The timing of the
model is as follows: exogenous breakup, learn about jobs, accept jobs if unemployed,
pass jobs onto unemployed network member if employed, network members accept jobs,
work, end of period. The model gives rise to 2 propositions which are useful in the
context of Palanpur.
Proposition 3.1. For all values 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1, an increase in cohort size Nj
decreases sjc for all c.
Proposition 3.2. The impact of an increase inNj on skk is monotonically increasing from
period k = j to period k = j+ S− 1
That is, an increase in the size of the current cohort, j, should decrease the current
employment rate for all cohorts in proposition 1. This is the competition eect within the
model, since all new members of the labour market are competing for the job information
held by existing members of the labour market. Proposition 2 states that an increase in
the size of an entering cohort negatively impacts cohorts near it (negative from Proposi-
tion 1), but that this eect becomes positive for cohorts suciently far apart. Eventually
the increase in cohort jwill increase the employment rate for cohorts arriving later. This
is because the fraction of individuals employed in cohort j through the referral channel
increases with each period, when their employment rate is suciently high they become
an asset to their network. This is called the information eect.
The model in Beaman (2012) describes further features and propositions of this model.
However, we only require these two propositions to inform our intuition and the empir-
ical strategy in the following section.
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3.9.2. Empirical Strategy
These two propositions together imply that an increase in the size of a cohort negat-
ively impacts the employment prospects of cohorts close to the larger cohort, but the
now larger cohort eventually increases the probability of employment for cohorts who
arrive suciently later, i.e. the larger cohort becomes an asset to the network when it’s
employment rate has increased suciently. This comes from the two competing eects,
the competition eect and the information eect. The competition eect is negative and
predicts that having a larger cohort decreases the probability of an individual obtaining
outside employment. The information eect is the increase in the employment rate which
comes from an increase in the likelihood of a referral due to the increase in network size.
These two eects give rise to a testable implication.
yidct = α+γ1Nidct+γ2Nidc(t−1)+γ3Nidc(t−2)+Xidctβ+δct+φd+idct (3.5)
Where yidct is the employment status of individual i in dynasty d and caste c in time
t. Nidct is the size of individual i’s cohort. Nidc(t−k) is the size of the cohort which
arrived in the labour market k periods before individual i.
Having a larger cohort decreases the probability of an individual obtaining outside
employment. This competition eect decreases with the distance between two cohorts.
Instead the information eect of referrals begins to dominate. Thus the γ coecients
from estimating Equation 3.5 will be more positive for network cohorts which are further
apart, that is for higher order γg’s. The implication of the model is that γ3 > γ2 > γ1
in the estimation of equation 3.5.
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The model gives no prediction about when the positive information eect will begin
to dominate, so multiple γ coecients are consistent with the model. However, there
should be a unique crossing from negative to positive.
Obviously these testable implications are derived from a model which assumes that
the probability of learning about a job is constant and independent across agents. In
the context of Palanpur this is possibly not a realistic assumption - it seems more likely
that those individuals who work outside the village are more likely to learn about new
job opportunities outside the village than those who live and work inside. However, if
this was incorporated in the model it would simply mean a stronger information eect.
The benets of having an outside worker in your network would be greater, leading to
greater concentration of outside jobs. This would not change the testable implication.
The other issue is the assumption that all network members are identical. In our setting
these network members are clearly related to each other in more subtle ways than simply
being in the same network. One would reasonably believe that an agent would be more
likely to refer a job an unemployed individual to whom they were more closely related
than one to whom they were more distantly related. This information is available to
us in the Palanpur context, and could potentially be used. However, the sample size is
limited and does not permit an examination at a more disaggregated level for reasons of
power.
When we take these testable implications to the Palanpur data we are faced with an
additional problem. The Palanpur data, and therefore individual’s occupations, have
been collected only seven times over 60 years. This complication means that we don’t
necessarily observe the networks of individuals at the time of entry to the job market.
However, we do observe the entire village and those who migrate out. This enables us to
generate networks for an individual at any age. As a result we don’t use an individual’s
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actual entry into the job market as the denition of their cohort, rather we use the indi-
viduals within 4 years of their age in our sample when they rst appear in a survey as
an adult. We calculate the networks at their rst appearance as an adult since we believe
this is most representative of the cohort with which he joined the labour market35 We
calculate the older cohort variables by counting the number of males within an villager’s
network (caste or dynasty) who are within a range of ages older than the villager on the
villagers rst appearance in the data as an adult. All males in these cohorts are counted,
whether they have left Palanpur or not in any survey. All older cohorts are made such
that they do not overlap.
We use a linear probability model to estimate equation 3.5 to allow us to include xed
eects. We know that probit specications are unreliable for large numbers of xed
eects, see Greene (2004).
3.9.3. Outside Employment Results
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show the results of a set of Beaman (2012) specications with outside
employment as the dependent variable for caste and dynasty networks respectively. The
independent variables used are individual-level competition network variables which
represent the number of male network members within their dynasty who are within 4
years of certain ages, all dened relative to the individuals age. These relative ages are 0,
9, 18, 27 and 36 years dierence in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. They are dened in this way so
that there is no intersection between these variables, that is a network member cannot
be in 2 of these groups.
35In theory we could construct this network for an individual at any age, e.g. 18. In practice it makes
almost no dierence since we include all out-migrants, the only dierences would be created by the
death of network members between an individual being 18 and their rst appearance as an adult.












Table 3.12.: Outside Work Beaman Caste Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Network members
in Cohort
−0.00261 −0.00200 −0.00224 0.00147 −0.00193 0.0000575 0.00189
(0.00304) (0.00292) (0.00313) (0.00313) (0.00301) (0.00304) (0.00326)
Cohort
5 6 age 6 13 above
0.00767** 0.00619* 0.00818** 0.0102*** 0.00632* 0.0103*** 0.0112***
(0.00363) (0.00346) (0.00365) (0.00339) (0.00357) (0.00326) (0.00363)
Cohort
14 6 age 6 22 above
0.00517 0.00425 0.00326 0.00130 0.00434 0.00540 0.00154
(0.00476) (0.00466) (0.00483) (0.00509) (0.00481) (0.00480) (0.00511)
Cohort
23 6 age 6 31 above
0.000774 0.0000261 0.000402 −0.00490 −0.0000389 −0.00375 −0.00478
(0.00536) (0.00543) (0.00531) (0.00512) (0.00560) (0.00524) (0.00517)
Cohort
32 6 age 6 40 above
−0.00763
(0.00865)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No
Observations 1904 1891 1896 1695 1891 1891 1695
Castes 15 14 13 13 14 14 13
Dynasties 128 115 125 105 115 115 105
Individuals 791 778 788 748 778 778 748
Mean Dep Var 0.251 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.252 0.252 0.265
R2 0.151 0.251 0.204 0.434 0.440 0.507 0.434
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.119 0.260 0.109 0.030 0.273 0.020 0.050
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside village. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years
of age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the
caste level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an adult in the data.
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The results for caste in Table 3.12 show that the eect of an individual’s network is
negative, albeit statistically insignicant, in 4 of the 7 specications, and insignicantly
positive in the others. These results are suggestive of the negative competition eect
for caste networks. The earlier caste cohorts are positively associated with outside em-
ployment on the whole. This association is strongest with the cohort who are between
5 and 13 years older - which is signicantly dierent from zero at the 10% level at least
in all specications. However, earlier cohorts than this appear to have smaller positive
associations with employment outside, and are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
A one standard deviation increase in the members of all earlier cohorts (from ages 5-
31 in regression 4) increases the probability of outside employment by 5.28 percentage












Table 3.13.: Outside Work Beaman Dynasty Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Network members
in Cohort
0.00846 0.0110 0.00684 0.0151 0.0111 0.00869 0.0156
(0.0149) (0.0167) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0179) (0.0168)
Cohort
5 6 age 6 13 above
0.0113 0.0221* 0.0113 0.0196 0.0224* 0.0220* 0.0199
(0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0120)
Cohort
14 6 age 6 22 above
0.0497** 0.0570** 0.0507** 0.0574* 0.0573** 0.0653** 0.0563*
(0.0207) (0.0227) (0.0202) (0.0297) (0.0234) (0.0278) (0.0296)
Cohort
23 6 age 6 31 above
−0.0196 −0.0134 −0.0205 0.000708 −0.0130 0.0000814 −0.00130
(0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0185) (0.0220)
Cohort
32 6 age 6 40 above
−0.00828
(0.0331)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No
Observations 1904 1891 1896 1695 1891 1891 1695
Castes 15 14 13 13 14 14 13
Dynasties 128 115 125 105 115 115 105
Individuals 791 778 788 748 778 778 748
Mean Dep Var 0.251 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.252 0.252 0.265
R2 0.157 0.259 0.211 0.437 0.446 0.511 0.437
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.064 0.017 0.049 0.155 0.021 0.065 0.256
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside village. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years
of age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the
dynasty level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an adult in the data.
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Table 3.13 contains the dynasty level results of the same specications. The pattern of
coecients is much more consistent with the implications of the model than those for
caste networks. The sizes of the coecients for the 14-22 years older cohort are larger
than those for the 5-13 years older cohort. These earlier cohorts are jointly signicant
and positively associated with increased outside employment probability in 5 of the 7
specications, 3 at the 5% signicance level, 2 at 10%. A one standard deviation increase
in the size of all older cohorts within a dynasty (ages 5-31 in specication 4) leads to a
7.27 percentage point increase in the outside employment probability. This is 27.44%
increase relative to the sample mean.
When we construct these competition variables for dierent competition sizes the
pattern that emerges is qualitatively similar. Network members who are between 12
and 20 years older than the individual in question seem to have the greatest impact on
the probability of employment outside the village36. Appendix Tables C.4, C.5 and C.6
demonstrate the robustness of these results to dierent sizes of cohort.
However, in the Table 3.13 specications we do not see the negative competition eect
present for the individual’s own cohort - instead the coecients are all insignicantly
positive. One possible explanation for this pattern is that, as shown in section 3.8.1, the
short run job network eects appear to be much stronger for dynasties than castes. So
this, combined with the feature of the Palanpur data whereby individual employment
may be observed long after the job has been obtained, could mean that the point at
which larger cohorts become benecial to the network is very early after their entry
into the labour market. Another piece of evidence consistent with this explanation is
illustrated when an individual’s cohort is split into 2 parts, older and younger than the
individual. Table 3.14 performs this test by including an additional variable which is the
36Remember that this is not only the eect of fathers, all male dynasty members are included.
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Table 3.14.: Outside Employment Beaman Dynasty Regressions - Split Co-
hort
(1) (2) (3)


















23 6 age 6 31 above
−0.0124 −0.0120 0.00244
(0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0189)
Year FE Yes Yes No
Dynasty FE Yes No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No Yes No
Observations 1891 1891 1695
Castes 14 14 13
Dynasties 115 115 105
Individuals 778 778 748
Mean Dep Var 0.252 0.252 0.265
R2 0.259 0.446 0.438
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.013 0.016 0.116
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside vil-
lage. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years of
age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions
include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the dynasty
level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an
adult in the data.
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count of all of the male dynasty members who are between 0 and 4 years older than
the individual. This means the original network cohort variable now shows the eect
of those network members who are younger than the individual, and the eect of older
cohort members is the sum of the two coecients. We see that the eect of younger
members is much smaller than the eect of older cohort members, and is negative for two
of the three specications. This result is consistent with the existence of job networks in
outside employment since younger members likely move into the job market after the
individual in question, therefore they are not in an individual’s network of contacts when
they join, thus the only eect from younger members should be the competition eect.
However, members of a cohort who are just older may also be able to refer an individual
to a job via the information eect. If we take these coecients seriously then what
we see is that in the Palanpur context the information eect is much stronger than the
competition eect. This helps to explain why in most specications all the coecients
are positive and there is no crossing of zero where the information eect overwhelms
the competition eect. Given the size of the village relative to the job markets where
most of this outside employment takes place it is perhaps not surprising that the eect
of one extra competitor in ones network is not that important on the margin.
One feature of all the results seems to be that cohorts which arrive substantially earlier
have a smaller impact on outside employment rates, and in some cases negative although
insignicant37. Empirically this seems to happen for cohorts who are more than 25 years
older. We hypothesise that it is plausible that network members who arrive in the job
market considerably earlier than an individual will have left the job market by the time
they are needed to help a new network member get a job, or that it is possible that their
37Interestingly this feature also seems to be present to some extent in the results of Beaman (2012). Al-
though in her context this occurs for cohorts who arrive 3 to 4 years earlier, rather than some 25 years
in our context.
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own connections are no longer useful due to the changing nature of outside employment
in this context of structural transformation. Perhaps a more complicated model would
predict a hump-shaped pattern of this type. However, the simple model we use abstracts
from such possibilities.
As a robustness test we ran the regressions in Table 3.12 and 3.13 with a dummy for
regular employment as the dependent variable. Given the evidence on the lack of net-
work eects for regular employment we have shown for short run networks we do not
expect a pattern consistent with the model to emerge from these regressions. Reassur-
ingly when we do so there is only one coecient which is signicantly dierent from
zero at the 10% level of signicance, out of 29 cohort coecients. Plus the coecients are
largely inconsistent with the pattern predicted by the testable implication of the model38.
One concern with this approach is that there is no information on in or out migration
from Palanpur before the 1958 survey. So accurate cohorts cannot be obtained for those
who would have entered the labour market before this period. However, out-migration
rates for young males in this time period was low. As we show in Section 1.6, the percent-
age of 10-24 year old males migrating out of Palanpur between 1958 and 1975 is 14.7%.
This migration rate is increasing, and is thus likely to have been lower before 1958. Plus
this is migration over a long time period, an equivalent is to 14.7% of males migrating out
between 1941 and 1958 - which, even if we assume no population growth between these
two years is only approximately 12 individuals. This estimate is an upper bound given
the likely presence of population growth and an increasing migration trend. Even so,
spread over each of the castes or dynasties this small number of individuals is unlikely
to make much dierence empirically. Additionally, when we replicate the results from
this section using data only from the 1975 survey onwards the qualitative results remain
38These tables are contained in the appendix, as Table C.7 and Table C.8
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the same.
The results from these two robustness tests are reassuring. However, the limitation
of our setting remains that we do not have a candidate for a natural experiment, to
provide exogenous variation in cohort sizes. Instead we rely on xed eects to help us
remove any potential endogeneity. Our data permit caste, dynasty, year, caste-year and
dynasty-year xed eects. They do not permit individual xed eects because we are
using cohorts at a given age, which do not vary within an individual. Reassuringly, the
exact combination of xed eects we use does not seem to change the qualitative nature
of our estimates. In our most restrictive specication we use dynasty-year xed eects,
thus we are comparing the outside employment outcomes of males from within the same
dynasty who appear in the same survey at dierent ages and thus have dierent cohort
sizes. Therefore if there is variation in individual characteristics which make one more
likely to undertake outside employment, e.g. ability, and this is correlated positively
(negatively) with older (current) cohort sizes conditional on current (older) cohort sizes
within dynasty in the same survey, our results would be aected by this endogeneity.
It is dicult to think of a plausible mechanism through which you could get this set of
correlations, but we cannot rule it out.
3.10. Migration
Migration is a common feature of Palanpur. Section 1.6 demonstrated the patterns of
migration out of Palanpur over the survey period and showed they are consistent with
migration rates across rural India. However, the pattern of migration is not the same
across castes or dynasties. The proportion of males in castes who migrate away from
the village at some point in their life ranges from 19.5% to 100%, for dynasties this range
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is 0− 100%39.
We hypothesise that the networks in outside employment that we have shown operate
over many decades in Palanpur may have long run eects on individual and dynasty
outcomes through their eect on migration patterns. This hypothesis is supported by
some descriptive statistics from the village - a male in Palanpur is 6.5 percentage points
more likely to be an out-migrant if their dynasty network contained an outside worker
two surveys previously, this is a 32% increase40.
Such an empirical feature may occur through a number of mechanisms. One potential
mechanism is that observing closely a network member who is not very dierent from
you may alter an individual’s perceived returns to migration through learning about
wage rates and types of work or accommodation away from the village. It is ultimately
these perceived returns upon which individual migration decisions are based. This in-
formation may also change individuals perceived returns to education41. There are ob-
viously a number of other candidate explanations, for example eects on aspirations
or expectations from seeing achievements by those similar to you as demonstrated by
Jensen (2012) and Jensen and Oster (2009). Unfortunately we will not be able to distin-
guish these mechanisms from each other in this chapter42.
An example network mechanism which could lead to higher levels of migration in
dynasties with larger numbers of outside workers is that individuals who work outside
gain contacts from outside the village through work or travel, these new contacts expand
39Mean=50.2, Std. Dev. 36.2 for dynasties. Mean=58.7, Std. Dev. 31.6 for castes.
40This feature is robust to larger distances between surveys.
41See Jensen (2010) for a paper which demonstrates the importance of perceived returns to schooling.
42Akram et al. (2017) show that migrants who know migrants induced to migrate by their RCT in
Bangladesh are also more likely to migrate temporarily in the same season, and this eect does not
exist when households do not know migrants who received their treatment. This is an interesting
result, however since it is concerned with contemporaneous co-migration it is more likely to be about
mitigating the risk of temporary seasonal migration in their setting.
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the network through which dynasties can obtain referrals - and the jobs being referred
may be more diverse. Consistent with this if a male was employed outside the village
two surveys previously they are 13.85 percentage points more likely to have migrated
away from the village (a 58.57% increase).
The census of households in Palanpur includes asking about births and deaths of
household members in the period between surveys. Households are also asked about
individuals living outside the village who are related to the household head. From this
we can impute which individuals migrate out of Palanpur. We do not observe the occu-
pation of all migrants. However, we can use migration as an outcome. We cannot show
that migrants are better o, however, there is a wealth of evidence (Munshi and Rosenz-
weig (2016); Morten (forthcoming)) that migration is ineciently low in this setting and
migration is welfare improving on average (Bryan et al. (2014); Garlick et al. (2016)).
To explore these long run eects we again create cohort variables, but this time we use
counts of those individuals within a dynasty who ever hold outside employment within
8 year cohorts. We run regressions of the following form:
midct = α+γ1Nidct+γ2Nidc(t−1)+γ3Nidc(t−2)+Xidctβ+δct+φd+idct (3.6)
Wheremidct is a dummy variable for the out-migration status of individual i in dyn-
asty d and caste c in time t. Nidct is the count of individuals within i’s cohort who ever
hold outside employment. Nidc(t−k) is the count of individuals who ever hold outside
employment in the cohort which arrived in the labour market k periods before individual
i. We focus on individuals who have ever held outside employment since our focus is
on the long run eects of these networks, we are less interested in a contemporaneous
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eect. Ideally we would include counts of individuals within a cohort who have worked
outside between an individual’s birth and date of migration (or date of survey). However,
our data does not permit us to determine the exact date of migration and employment
outside for all individuals. The use of ever holding outside employment as a proxy is
likely to lead to increased noise, sadly this is unavoidable.43
If one of the candidate mechanisms discussed above is present then we would expect
to see a positive correlation between the presence of older network members in outside
employment and migration of younger members - that is positive values for γ2, γ3. We
expect γ1 to also be positive in our setting, because Palanpur is small relative to other
labour markets and towns to which individuals would migrate, there is unlikely to be
a competition eect in migration44. The size of γ1 is ambiguous. If we could use our
preferred measure we would expect γ2 > γ1 > 0, since any cohort members employed
outside would likely have shorter periods of outside employment over which to alter
perceived returns. Given we are using our time-invariant proxy this may not be true.
Table 3.15 reports the results of regressions based on equation 3.6. We see that in the
most restrictive specications, with dynasty-year xed eects, individuals with more
outside workers older than them in their dynasty are signicantly more likely to migrate
out of the village. This association is strongest for cohorts between 5 and 13 years older.
In contrast, the number of own cohort members who obtain outside employment is not
signicantly correlated with individual level migration decisions in any specication,
and appears both negatively and positively. Columns 8 and 9 show that our results are
unchanged by controlling for individuals who achieve high levels of education.
43We include only adult males since we are interested in those who migrate for work, many of those who
migrate before the age of 18 are undoubtedly part of the movement of whole households.
44In fact Akram et al. (2017) show a complementarity in migration decisions in their study. They argue
that this co-migration helps to mitigate the risk inherent in temporary seasonal migration.
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As shown in the previous section, these dynasties create outside workers through
network eects and here there is a positive association between outside workers within
a dynasty and migration of younger generations. We believe this is suggestive evidence
that these dynasty level job networks which help individuals obtain jobs also have long
run eects because they induce dynasty members to migrate out of the village. Given
the existing evidence on the returns to migration in the Indian context, this suggests
that these job networks can lead to long run increases in inequality across dynasties.
Despite the absence of a source of clearly exogenous variation and a small sample
size these results demonstrate an interesting long run consequence of job networks. It
is unlikely that this is the only consequence of these networks, and we think this is a












Table 3.15.: Migration Eects of Outside Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated
outside workers
in Cohort
−0.00961 −0.000304 −0.00944 0.0237 −0.0000297 0.0133 0.0242 0.0243 0.0138
(0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0171)
Cohort workers
5 6 age 6 13 above
−0.00493 0.00615 0.00308 0.0496** 0.00658 0.0313 0.0497** 0.0465** 0.0280
(0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Cohort workers
14 6 age 6 22 above
0.00323 0.00513 0.00931 0.0259 0.00538 0.0174 0.0261 0.0229 0.0140
(0.0202) (0.0171) (0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0184)
Cohort workers
23 6 age 6 31 above
−0.0100 −0.0222 −0.0108 −0.00802 −0.0222 −0.0216 −0.00668 −0.00553 −0.0192
(0.0264) (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0214) (0.0246) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0225)
Cohort workers
32 6 age 6 40 above
0.0191
(0.0362)
Highly Educated −0.0731** −0.0807***
(0.0294) (0.0303)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Observations 2362 2361 2350 2095 2361 2361 2095 2095 2361
Castes 17 17 14 13 17 17 13 13 17
Dynasties 130 129 127 107 129 129 107 107 129
Individuals 826 825 823 788 825 825 788 788 825
Mean Dep Var 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.200 0.203 0.203 0.200 0.200 0.203
R2 0.166 0.313 0.214 0.491 0.454 0.543 0.491 0.495 0.547
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.977 0.784 0.910 0.056 0.792 0.235 0.095 0.091 0.328
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for migration. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years of
age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are
at the dynasty level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an adult in the data. The Cohorts here are a
count of all individuals in dynasty within an age range relative to one individual who have ever held outside employment
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3.11. Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown evidence of the presence of labour market networks in
a village in rural India. These networks are important determinants of job attainment
in the short run. Having a dynasty network contact employed outside the village leads
to a 70% increase in ones own likelihood of working outside the village. However, the
structure of ones familial network is an important determinant of individual outcomes.
Those with an additional competitor within their dynasty cohort are approximately 15%
less likely to obtain an outside job in the short run. Using a subset of jobs for which we
believe a priori job networks are less likely to determine employment we nd smaller
short run network eects and insignicant eects of competition consistent with this
prior. These eects are large relative to a number of other studies of these job networks45.
This is not particularly surprising given that most labour market network estimates are
from developed countries, where formal sector employment rates are higher and other
job nding institutions are better established. Unlike other studies of network eects
we exploit the uniqueness of the Palanpur data to illustrate the dynamic eects of these
networks on labour market outcomes over 60 years, during a time of rapid changes in the
nature of labour within this context due to structural transformation. To the best of our
knowledge there have not been any other studies of labour market networks over such
a long time horizon. Magruder (2010) examines intergenerational networks in South
Africa, but does so using a 3 year panel so his ndings are more analogous to our short
run ndings with specied relationships rather than taking the network as a whole.
45The most directly comparable are those of Laschever (2013) who nds the eect of additional employed
network member of 0.8 percentage points, while ours are an order of magnitude greater. However, it
must be noted he examines employment generally and 93% of his sample are employed. In contrast,
less than 20% of our sample is employed outside the village.
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We use a model from Beaman (2012) to explore these dynamics and inform our em-
pirical strategy. In her original paper she uses this framework to examine labour market
dynamics in a 5 year panel. We have extended this analysis to much longer time series
and shown that it remains a useful framework with which to study these dynamics. We
nd that dynasty and caste networks exhibit both the competition eect from network
members as well as the information eect of job referrals. However, the referral con-
tacts who are important for individual employment prospects seem to dier for the two
networks.
We also use this framework to illustrate that these dynasty networks have long run
consequences for their members. Younger male members of those dynasties with more
outside workers are more likely to migrate away from Palanpur. We know from the
migration literature that migrants experience large increases in income and consumption
on average. Thus these dynastic labour market networks lead to divergent outcomes for
future dynasty members, and are as such a source of persistent inequality.
Our work also relates closely to the work of Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006); Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2016); Munshi (2011); Anderson (2011) who demonstrate the import-
ance of caste networks in India. We nd evidence consistent with these papers, that
castes have important labour market network eects. However, we also nd that focus-
ing just on castes as a source of networks in an Indian context will overlook networks
with even stronger social ties and larger labour market network eects. There appear to
be important dierences in the dynamics of these labour market job networks for castes
and dynasties. Caste networks appear to lose their value as a link to obtain employment
more quickly than do dynasty networks. Also, the job information sharing eects appear
to be much stronger for dynasties than castes.
While we have exploited various xed eect estimation strategies to try and reassure
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that we are capturing the true eect of job networks, we cannot hope to control for all
possible sources of unobserved individual time-varying characteristics and this remains
a limitation of our study. We do not have a source of explicitly exogenous variation to
exploit in this setting. However, we believe the benets to estimating the eects of em-
ployment networks over the long run in a previously understudied area of rural labour
markets within a developing country outweigh these potential endogeneity concerns.
Palanpur is a well connected village, it is not clear whether these eects would be the
same in a village which did not have access to transport allowing for commuting. One
would imagine that where commuting is more costly (in either a monetary or temporal
sense) it would be less common. This may mean that network eects take longer to
become established. Although it is conceivable that these similar network referral eects
may operate in the more long distance temporary migration which is common across
India (Morten (forthcoming)), this is certainly an interesting avenue for further research.
However, that is not to say that Palanpur’s experience is unique. Travelling by train in
India one sees countless villages near the railway line. Additionally, more and more
villages are being connected to the expanding road network (Datta (2012)).
Another interesting question raised by our work is the mechanism by which this ex-
posure to outside employment may lead to increased migration. Candidate explanations
include the role of aspirations or expectations of the kind described by Jensen (2012)
and Jensen and Oster (2009), revealed information about the returns to education as in
Jensen (2010), or simply an extension of the possible network from which they can now
receive job information - whether this be work colleagues or extended social network
contacts in the place of work.
There are avenues for extension of the work within this chapter. One could try to
exploit the range or density of an individual’s network. For example, examining the
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role of the proportion of weak versus strong ties within networks (in the spirit of Mont-
gomery (1992)). Alternatively, using the literal range of networks - those members who
migrate away to other areas, Moradabad versus small nearby villages may have dierent
eects46. However, the obvious problem with these extensions is the available sample
size, there are only so many castes or dynasties within Palanpur.
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C.2. Caste Descriptives
Table C.1.: Mean Real Income Per Capita by Caste-Year
1958 1964 1975 1984 2009 Total
Thakur 203.4 245.9 326.5 266.3 474.3 333.6
Murao 280.2 252.7 332.8 330.8 456.1 353.7
Dhimar 121.3 97.71 221.6 210.7 343.0 223.7
Gadaria 195.5 228.4 278.2 220.7 502.8 308.4
Dhobi 249.1 802.0 157.3 196.0 162.4 187.8
Teli 112.2 114.3 237.8 228.6 538.8 308.9
Passi 191.8 260.5 263.8 228.3 315.5 242.9
Jatab 152.9 129.2 208.5 117.6 298.3 203.8
Lohar 254.2 . . . . 254.2
Nai 63.43 61.66 . 101.4 197.0 105.1
Kayasth 167.1 233.2 251.3 290.5 544.0 277.6
Khati 28.97 29.15 . . . 29.08
Carpenter . . 171.3 . . 171.3
Balmiki . 227.6 204.4 163.6 0 118.7
Brahmin . . . . . .
Unknown . . . . 872.0 872.0
Village Average 190.9 204.5 278.2 241.9 421.2 291.4
Note: Values are mean per capita annual incomes of households,
they are in 1960-61 Rupees. Income is not available for the sur-
veys in 1993 and 2015. Members of the Brahmin caste were only
present in 1993, when no income data were gathered.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table C.2.: Competitive Network Descriptives - Caste
Panel A Caste
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 All
Mean age
dierence 1.47 1.30 0.93 0.74 0.65 0.48 0.45 0.73
Median age
dierence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean % with compet-
itor within 1 years 81.8 78.6 85.7 88.8 90.6 92.3 92.6 88.9
Mean: count compet-
itors within 1 years 2.77 2.86 4.14 4.88 6.34 7.03 7.75 5.76
Median % with compet-
itor within 1 years 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 1 years 3 2 3 4 4 6 7 4
Mean % with compet-
itor within 2 years 87.2 87.3 90.2 93.7 94.8 96.2 96.6 93.6
Mean: count compet-
itors within 2 years 4.40 4.75 6.83 8.01 10.6 11.5 12.7 9.48
Median % with compet-
itor within 2 years 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 2 years 4 4 5 6 8 11 11 7
Mean % with compet-
itor within 3 years 89.3 89.7 91.4 94.5 96.2 97.5 97.7 94.9
Mean: count compet-
itors within 3 years 5.89 6.47 9.43 11.1 14.6 16.1 17.7 13.1
Median % with compet-
itor within 3 years 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 3 years 5 6 7 9 11 14 15 10
Mean % with compet-
itor within 4 years 89.6 91.0 92.5 96.0 96.6 97.5 97.7 95.4
Mean: count compet-
itors within 4 years 7.42 8.09 11.9 14.0 18.4 20.3 22.3 16.6
Median % with compet-
itor within 4 years 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 4 years 6 7 10 12 14 17 21 13
Note: All Males in migration sample included. The Mean and Median age dif-
ference refer to the age dierence between an individual and the closest male
member in their network in the migration sample.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table C.3.: Competitive Network Descriptives - Dynasty
Panel B Dynasty
1958 1964 1975 1984 1993 2009 2015 All
Mean age
dierence 12.8 12.8 9.37 7.21 5.66 4.36 3.90 6.73
Median age
dierence 7 7 5 4 3 2 2 3
Mean % with compet-
itor within 1 years 8.06 7.67 12.9 19.5 27.7 33.9 37.9 25.1
Mean: count compet-
itors within 1 years 0.090 0.080 0.13 0.26 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.33
Median % with compet-
itor within 1 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Median: count compet-
itors within 1 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean % with compet-
itor within 2 years 22.4 21.4 28.4 36.1 44.6 53.4 57.8 42.5
Mean: count compet-
itors within 2 years 0.27 0.26 0.41 0.51 0.78 0.96 1.14 0.73
Median % with compet-
itor within 2 years 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 0
Median: count compet-
itors within 2 years 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Mean % with compet-
itor within 3 years 29.9 30.4 41.8 46.9 56.3 64.5 67.9 53.3
Mean: count compet-
itors within 3 years 0.38 0.40 0.66 0.78 1.17 1.39 1.61 1.07
Median % with compet-
itor within 3 years 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 3 years 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Mean % with compet-
itor within 4 years 33.4 36.0 46.9 57.4 64.4 72.2 74.7 60.4
Mean: count compet-
itors within 4 years 0.46 0.55 0.87 1.07 1.53 1.81 2.07 1.40
Median % with compet-
itor within 4 years 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100
Median: count compet-
itors within 4 years 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1
Note: All Males in migration sample included. The Mean and Median age dif-
ference refer to the age dierence between an individual and the closest male
member in their network in the migration sample.
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table C.4.: Robustness of Long Run Eects to Alternative Network Sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Members in
1 year Cohort
0.0472 0.0458 0.0397 0.0457 0.0298 0.0444 0.0479 0.0492 0.0484
(0.0326) (0.0314) (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0321) (0.0319) (0.0330)
Cohort
2 6 age 6 4 above
0.00575 0.00804 0.00659 0.00812 0.00426 0.0106 0.0154 0.0159 0.0161
(0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0258) (0.0276) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0234)
Cohort
5 6 age 6 7 above
0.0272 0.0325 0.0157 0.0324 0.0232 0.0187 0.0237 0.0262 0.0303
(0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0274) (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0259)
Cohort
8 6 age 6 10 above
0.00505 −0.000843 −0.0164 −0.000674 −0.0116 −0.0172 −0.0217 −0.0207 −0.0161
(0.0246) (0.0209) (0.0195) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0218)
Cohort
11 6 age 6 13 above
0.0455 0.0466* 0.0460 0.0486*
(0.0289) (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0275)
Cohort








20 6 age 6 22 above
0.0506
(0.0392)
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 1902 1889 1695 1889 1889 1695 1695 1695 1695
Castes 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Dynasties 127 114 105 114 114 105 105 105 105
Individuals 790 777 748 777 777 748 748 748 748
Mean Dep Var 0.251 0.252 0.265 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265
R2 0.151 0.252 0.432 0.441 0.505 0.433 0.438 0.439 0.441
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.670 0.607 0.840 0.633 0.843 0.403 0.049 0.070 0.088
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside village. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years of age. Standard errors are
clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the dynasty level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst










Table C.5.: Robustness of Long Run Eects to Alternative Network Sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Network members
in Cohort
0.0372** 0.0390** 0.0446** 0.0392* 0.0351 0.0423** 0.0418** 0.0441** 0.0437**
(0.0180) (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0223) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0204)
Cohort
3 6 age 6 7 above
0.00375 0.0152 0.0109 0.0153 0.0142 0.0168 0.0174 0.0190 0.0176
(0.0186) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0203)
Cohort
8 6 age 6 12 above
0.000940 0.00118 −0.00149 0.00144 −0.00195 0.00332 0.00463 0.00363 0.00400
(0.0226) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0198)
Cohort
13 6 age 6 17 above
0.0517** 0.0668** 0.0606** 0.0671** 0.0699** 0.0625** 0.0633** 0.0616** 0.0634**
(0.0237) (0.0256) (0.0287) (0.0265) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0303)
Cohort
18 6 age 6 22 above
0.0513 0.0525 0.0511 0.0522*
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0313) (0.0312)
Cohort








33 6 age 6 37 above
0.0212
(0.0360)
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 1904 1891 1695 1891 1891 1695 1695 1695 1695
Castes 15 14 13 14 14 13 13 13 13
Dynasties 128 115 105 115 115 105 105 105 105
Individuals 791 778 748 778 778 748 748 748 748
Mean Dep Var 0.251 0.252 0.265 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265
R2 0.156 0.257 0.437 0.445 0.509 0.440 0.440 0.440 0.440
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.165 0.045 0.199 0.054 0.121 0.221 0.305 0.352 0.401
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside village. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years of age. Standard errors are
clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the dynasty level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst










Table C.6.: Robustness of Long Run Eects to Alternative Network Sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside Work Outside
Network members
in Cohort
0.0177 0.0211 0.0143 0.0289* 0.0213 0.0226 0.0308* 0.0302*
(0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0158) (0.0157)
Cohort
4 6 age 6 10 above
0.00155 0.0136 0.00432 0.0129 0.0139 0.0148 0.0120 0.0108
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0134)
Cohort
11 6 age 6 17 above
0.0371* 0.0502** 0.0358** 0.0530** 0.0505** 0.0572** 0.0514** 0.0530**
(0.0193) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0235) (0.0210) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0239)
Cohort
18 6 age 6 24 above
0.0399* 0.0524** 0.0397* 0.0540** 0.0527** 0.0615** 0.0517** 0.0535**
(0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0257) (0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0255) (0.0252)
Cohort




32 6 age 6 38 above
0.0163
(0.0305)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 1904 1891 1896 1695 1891 1891 1695 1695
Castes 15 14 13 13 14 14 13 13
Dynasties 128 115 125 105 115 115 105 105
Individuals 791 778 788 748 778 778 748 748
Mean Dep Var 0.251 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.252 0.252 0.265 0.265
R2 0.157 0.260 0.210 0.439 0.447 0.512 0.439 0.440
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.087 0.012 0.062 0.068 0.015 0.028 0.094 0.133
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in outside village. Includes all males in migration sample who are over 18 years of age. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age and age squared. Cohorts are at the dynasty level. Cohorts are
calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an adult in the data.
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Table C.7.: Robustness of Long Run Eects to Regular Work as Placebo - Caste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job
Network members
in Cohort
−0.00127 −0.00000367 −0.00369* −0.000633 0.0000185 −0.000730 −0.0000290
(0.00222) (0.00223) (0.00216) (0.00211) (0.00229) (0.00215) (0.00229)
Cohort
5 6 age 6 13 above
0.00229 0.00337 −0.00187 0.000732 0.00340 0.00154 0.00211
(0.00240) (0.00260) (0.00265) (0.00287) (0.00268) (0.00300) (0.00287)
Cohort
14 6 age 6 22 above
0.00758** 0.00587 0.00482 0.00211 0.00585 0.00333 0.00265
(0.00370) (0.00357) (0.00346) (0.00368) (0.00367) (0.00372) (0.00381)
Cohort
23 6 age 6 31 above
0.00610 0.00240 0.00525 −0.0000861 0.00235 −0.000844 −0.0000329
(0.00377) (0.00382) (0.00365) (0.00402) (0.00394) (0.00395) (0.00397)
Cohort
32 6 age 6 40 above
−0.0102
(0.00714)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No
Observations 2362 2361 2350 2095 2361 2361 2095
Castes 17 17 14 13 17 17 13
Dynasties 130 129 127 107 129 129 107
Individuals 826 825 823 788 825 825 788
Mean Dep Var 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.119
R2 0.070 0.156 0.117 0.326 0.255 0.330 0.328
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.044 0.105 0.272 0.924 0.122 0.704 0.661
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in regular employment. Includes all males in migration sample
who are over 18 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age











Table C.8.: Robustness of Long Run Eects to Regular Work as Placebo - Dynasty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job Regular Job
Network members
in Cohort
0.0111 0.000986 0.00911 −0.00544 0.000840 −0.00817 −0.00426
(0.00993) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0122)
Cohort
5 6 age 6 13 above
0.0117 0.0116 0.00822 −0.00147 0.0115 0.00325 −0.000723
(0.00908) (0.00857) (0.00863) (0.00847) (0.00879) (0.00811) (0.00855)
Cohort
14 6 age 6 22 above
0.0255 0.0333* 0.0233 0.0217 0.0334 0.0288 0.0195
(0.0206) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0234) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0236)
Cohort
23 6 age 6 31 above
−0.00142 −0.00166 −0.00541 −0.0126 −0.00174 −0.0110 −0.0171
(0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0148)
Cohort
32 6 age 6 40 above
−0.0196
(0.0205)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Caste FE Yes No No No No No No
Dynasty FE No Yes No No No Yes No
Caste-Year FE No No Yes No No No No
Dynasty-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes
Dynasty-Year Trend No No No No Yes Yes No
Observations 2362 2361 2350 2095 2361 2361 2095
Castes 17 17 14 13 17 17 13
Dynasties 130 129 127 107 129 129 107
Individuals 826 825 823 788 825 825 788
Mean Dep Var 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.119
R2 0.071 0.156 0.119 0.329 0.255 0.333 0.329
P-Value of Older
Cohorts 0.246 0.035 0.380 0.715 0.043 0.524 0.607
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for working in regular employment. Includes all males in migration sample
who are over 18 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at the dynasty level. All regressions include controls for age
and age squared. Cohorts are at the dynasty level. Cohorts are calculated at an individual’s rst appearance as an adult
in the data.
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